On Visual Experience of Objects: Comments on John Campbell’s Reference and Consciousness.
John Campbell argues that visual attention to objects is the means by which we can refer to objects, and that this is so because conscious visual attention enables us to retrieve information about a location. It is argued here that while Campbell is right to think that we visually attend to objects,...
| Published in: | Philosophical Studies Vol. 127; no. 2; pp. 195 - 221 |
|---|---|
| Main Author: | |
| Format: | Article |
| Published: |
Springer Nature
Jan2006
|
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | View this record in EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=19274327&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 19274327 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318116 4L8 jtl: Philosophical Studies issn: 00318116 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Jan2006 vid: 127 iid: 2 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 19274327 10.1007/s11098-005-4941-2 ppf: 195 ppct: 26 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 225KB tig: atl: On Visual Experience of Objects: Comments on John Campbell’s Reference and Consciousness. aug: au: Matthen, Mohan affil: Department of Philosophy , University of British Columbia , V6T 1Z1 Vancouver Canada su: Campbell, John Right & wrong Ethics Immorality Attention Educational psychology sug: subj: Campbell, John Right & wrong Ethics Immorality Attention Educational psychology ab: John Campbell argues that visual attention to objects is the means by which we can refer to objects, and that this is so because conscious visual attention enables us to retrieve information about a location. It is argued here that while Campbell is right to think that we visually attend to objects, he does not give us sufficient ground for thinking that consciousness is involved, and is wrong to assign an intermediary role to location. Campbell’s view on sortals is also queried, as is his espousal of the so-called Referential View of Experience. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Philosophical Studies is a copyright of Springer, 2006. All Rights Reserved. item: Philosophical Studies holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2006 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
|---|