The Constituent Dynamic and the Two-Level Game in Chile.
Chile has undergone two consecutive failed attempts at constitutional replacement (2021–2022 and 2023), positioning it as a globally interesting case. While existing literature identifies macropolitical and institutional factors underlying such failures, certain key causal mechanisms remain unexplor...
| Publicado en: | Latin American Research Review Vol. 61; no. 1; pp. 80 - 100 |
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| Autores principales: | , , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Cambridge University Press
Mar2026
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=192777347&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 192777347 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00238791 LAR jtl: Latin American Research Review issn: 00238791 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Mar2026 vid: 61 iid: 1 pid: 15979 pub: Cambridge University Press artinfo: ui: 192777347 10.1017/lar.2025.10104 ppf: 80 ppct: 20 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 1.3MB tig: atl: The Constituent Dynamic and the Two-Level Game in Chile. aug: au: Fuentes, Claudio Valenzuela, Pedro Carril, Francisca affil: Universidad Diego Portales, Santiago, Chile. Center for Intercultural and Indigenous Rights, Santiago, Chile. su: Political doctrines Negotiation Applied psychology Democracy Constitutionalism sug: subj: Political doctrines Negotiation Applied psychology Democracy Constitutionalism keyword: Chile Constitución constituent process Constitution institucionalismo institutionalism political system proceso constituyente sistema político Constitución institucionalismo proceso constituyente sistema político Chile Constitución constituent process Constitution institucionalismo institutionalism political system proceso constituyente sistema político Constitución institucionalismo proceso constituyente sistema político ab: Chile has undergone two consecutive failed attempts at constitutional replacement (2021–2022 and 2023), positioning it as a globally interesting case. While existing literature identifies macropolitical and institutional factors underlying such failures, certain key causal mechanisms remain unexplored. This article addresses the central question of why majority-controlling political actors, aware of the need for broad national consensus, ultimately fail to achieve it. Framed as a two-level process—one at the elite negotiation level and the other at the electoral ratification level—this study elucidates the mechanisms operating at each stage that contributed to this dual failure. By analyzing these dynamics in detail, the article offers valuable lessons for future efforts to replace a constitution in a democratic setting. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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