Undermining Clientelism with Collective Confidence: Unbundling the Individual and Spillover Effects of Conditional Cash Transfers.
A growing body of evidence suggests that conditional cash transfers (CCTs) can shift voters’ electoral choices. Yet there remains a mismatch between reliance on aggregated municipal data and individual-level theories focused on retrospective rewards or reduced vulnerability to clientelism. Since CCT...
| Publicado en: | Latin American Research Review Vol. 61; no. 1; pp. 124 - 147 |
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| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Cambridge University Press
Mar2026
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=192777357&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 192777357 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00238791 LAR jtl: Latin American Research Review issn: 00238791 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Mar2026 vid: 61 iid: 1 pid: 15979 pub: Cambridge University Press artinfo: ui: 192777357 10.1017/lar.2025.10088 ppf: 124 ppct: 23 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 1.2MB tig: atl: Undermining Clientelism with Collective Confidence: Unbundling the Individual and Spillover Effects of Conditional Cash Transfers. aug: au: Phillips, Jonathan affil: Institute of Political Science, Leiden University, Leiden, Netherlands. University of São Paulo, São Paulo, Brazil. Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, US. su: Patronage Public welfare Externalities Collective action Conditional cash transfer programs Voters sug: subj: Patronage Public welfare Externalities Collective action Administration of Human Resource Programs (except Education, Public Health, and Veterans' Affairs Programs) Emergency and Other Relief Services Health and Welfare Funds Other Individual and Family Services Conditional cash transfer programs Voters keyword: ação coletiva clientelism clientelismo collective action conditional cash transfers feedback de políticas policy feedback transferências condicionais de renda ação coletiva clientelismo feedback de políticas transferências condicionais de renda ação coletiva clientelism clientelismo collective action conditional cash transfers feedback de políticas policy feedback transferências condicionais de renda ação coletiva clientelismo feedback de políticas transferências condicionais de renda ab: A growing body of evidence suggests that conditional cash transfers (CCTs) can shift voters’ electoral choices. Yet there remains a mismatch between reliance on aggregated municipal data and individual-level theories focused on retrospective rewards or reduced vulnerability to clientelism. Since CCTs also produce plausible spillovers on nonbeneficiaries, verifying who reacts, and how, is crucial to understanding their electoral effects. To empirically unbundle individual and spillover effects, the analysis exploits plausibly exogenous variation between beneficiaries of Brazil’s Bolsa Família and those on the waiting list. The evidence suggests that CCTs strengthen beneficiaries’ attitudes against clientelism, but they vote no differently than nonbeneficiaries. However, spillovers are strong: As CCT coverage expands, both beneficiaries and nonbeneficiaries turn against local incumbents. This pattern is inconsistent with existing theory, which relies on either polarization or positive spillovers. Instead, I propose a theory of collective confidence derived from strategic voting incentives in which CCT expansion fortifies all voters in resisting clientelism. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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