| Sumario: | This article examines alternative conceptions of agency and freedom through a comparative analysis of Friedrich Nietzsche and Talal Asad, focusing on their critiques of secular liberal subjectivity and the Enlightenment ideal of autonomous emancipation. Both thinkers challenge the notion of the unified, volitional subject by emphasizing the body's multiplicity and its capacity to enact agency through pain, suffering, and even death, rather than viewing these as mere constraints. Drawing on Nietzsche’s concept of the "will to power" and Asad’s critique of secular liberalism, the article highlights how tragedy serves as a framework for reimagining embodied agency beyond rational autonomy and self-determination. This tragic perspective destabilizes the secular liberal ideal of freedom as liberation from suffering, proposing instead a form of agency that embraces bodily excess and vulnerability. The article situates this discussion within broader scholarly efforts to rethink freedom and agency beyond Enlightenment paradigms, including the work of theorists like Saba Mahmood and Amy Hollywood.
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