Parental Responsibility and Our Special Relationship with Animal Companions.
What is the basis of our obligations to our animal companions? This is an important question for practical reasons, as the relationship that many individuals have with their animal companion is amongst the most intimate of relationships they share with a non-human animal. It is also important for th...
| Publicado en: | Journal of Value Inquiry Vol. 60; no. 2; pp. 247 - 263 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Jun2026
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=192844973&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 192844973 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00225363 OJ8 jtl: Journal of Value Inquiry issn: 00225363 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Jun2026 vid: 60 iid: 2 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 192844973 10.1007/s10790-023-09973-2 ppf: 247 ppct: 16 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 689KB tig: atl: Parental Responsibility and Our Special Relationship with Animal Companions. aug: au: Sigsbee, Dustin affil: https://ror.org/04p549618 University of South Carolina, Columbia, USA su: Responsibility Pets Parenting Animal welfare Moral attitudes Intimacy (Psychology) sug: subj: Responsibility Pets Parenting Animal welfare Moral attitudes Intimacy (Psychology) keyword: Animal Companions Causal-voluntarism Ethics of Partiality Parental Responsibility Philosophy and Religious Studies Philosophy Special Relationships ab: What is the basis of our obligations to our animal companions? This is an important question for practical reasons, as the relationship that many individuals have with their animal companion is amongst the most intimate of relationships they share with a non-human animal. It is also important for theoretical reasons. One of those reasons is that our commitments to animal companions may appear to present a kind of puzzle. If we think that we have moral commitments to animal companions that we do not have to other animals, such as livestock or free-roaming animals, what could explain this? I argue that the explanation for this difference in moral commitments is the result of the special relationship we have with our animal companions. More specifically, the basis of our moral commitments to animal companions are like those incurred by parents. Further, it is argued that causing the existence of or voluntarily taking on commitments of care for especially vulnerable and dependent sentient organisms implies robust responsibilities aimed at nurturing and promoting individual flourishing. This conclusion has implications regarding several related moral issues, such as whether animal companions require a moral education, what end-of-life commitments animal companion caregivers have, and whether it is justified to feed our animal companions other animals or let them engage in predation. Further, these issues are of practical interest to animal companion caregivers, law makers, and veterinarians, as well as being of theoretical interest to legal scholars and ethicists. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Journal of Value Inquiry is a copyright of Springer, 2026. All Rights Reserved. item: Journal of Value Inquiry holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2026 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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