Grassroots lobbying in Germany: Are moderately and greatly supported public petitions effective?
This paper investigates the effectiveness of a grassroots lobbying technique—public petitions—in Germany, applying the costly signaling theory and the economic theory of political information. I analyzed public petitions with at least 1,000 signatures, addressed by the Bundestag during its 19th term...
| Published in: | Parliamentary Affairs Vol. 79; no. 2; pp. 353 - 380 |
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| Format: | Article |
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Oxford University Press / USA
Apr2026
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| Online Access: | View this record in EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=192849861&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 192849861 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00312290 PAF jtl: Parliamentary Affairs issn: 00312290 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Apr2026 vid: 79 iid: 2 pid: 622 pub: Oxford University Press / USA artinfo: ui: 192849861 10.1093/pa/gsaf035 ppf: 353 ppct: 27 formats: tig: atl: Grassroots lobbying in Germany: Are moderately and greatly supported public petitions effective? aug: au: Olejnik, Maciej affil: Willy Brandt Centre for German and European Studies, University of Wrocław, Strażnicza 1-3 Street, Wrocław 50-206, Poland su: Germany Germany. Bundestag Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (Political party : Germany) Social advocacy Petitions Political endorsements Information theory in economics Political system efficacy sug: subj: Social advocacy Germany Germany. Bundestag Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (Political party : Germany) Other Social Advocacy Organizations Social advocacy organizations Human Rights Organizations Petitions Political endorsements Information theory in economics Political system efficacy keyword: Bundestag copyrightHolder:Hansard Society copyrightYear:2026 grassroots lobbying inLanguage:en public petitions publisher:Oxford University Press sameAs:https://dx.doi.org/10.1093/pa/gsaf035 the costly signaling theory the economic theory of political information Bundestag copyrightHolder:Hansard Society copyrightYear:2026 grassroots lobbying inLanguage:en public petitions publisher:Oxford University Press sameAs:https://dx.doi.org/10.1093/pa/gsaf035 the costly signaling theory the economic theory of political information ab: This paper investigates the effectiveness of a grassroots lobbying technique—public petitions—in Germany, applying the costly signaling theory and the economic theory of political information. I analyzed public petitions with at least 1,000 signatures, addressed by the Bundestag during its 19th term (2017–2021), and assessed the petitions' issue salience for the ruling parties, CDU/CSU and SPD. The findings reveal that public petitions can be an effective grassroots lobbying technique, with 31% of them being fulfilled. The ruling parties' endorsement of the issues raised in the petitions was a key factor in determining their effectiveness. Petitions addressing issues supported by both ruling parties were significantly more effective than those on issues opposed or ambiguously received by at least one ruling party. The study provides evidence supporting two key aspects of the economic theory of political information. First, the probability of fulfillment for petitions on higher salience issues supported by the ruling parties does not significantly differ between those with a large number of signatures (at least 50,000) and those with a moderate number (1,000 to 49,999). Moderately popular petitions on higher salience issues endorsed by CDU/CSU and SPD are nearly as effective as their more popular counterparts. Second, the probability of fulfillment for higher salience petitions opposed by the ruling parties also does not significantly differ between greatly and moderately popular petitions, as both were equally ineffective. Conversely, the study finds no strong support for the economic theory of political information's assumption that moderately popular petitions on lower party salience issues should be more effective than greatly popular ones. In contrast, an in-depth analysis using a logistic regression model shows that the level of public support does not significantly impact the petitions' effectiveness. This finding suggests that the costly signaling theory lacks explanatory power in the context of public petition effectiveness in Germany. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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