The executive trump card: government-initiated votes of confidence in parliamentary democracies.
Scholars have traditionally considered government-initiated votes of confidence a powerful tool that parliamentary executives can leverage to achieve policy and electoral goals. Yet, these votes remain a relatively understudied procedure, partly because theoretical efforts at making better sense of...
| Publicado en: | Parliamentary Affairs Vol. 79; no. 2; pp. 414 - 440 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Oxford University Press / USA
Apr2026
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=192849862&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 192849862 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00312290 PAF jtl: Parliamentary Affairs issn: 00312290 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Apr2026 vid: 79 iid: 2 pid: 622 pub: Oxford University Press / USA artinfo: ui: 192849862 10.1093/pa/gsaf036 ppf: 414 ppct: 26 formats: tig: atl: The executive trump card: government-initiated votes of confidence in parliamentary democracies. aug: au: Bromo, Francesco affil: Blavatnik School of Government, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK su: Majorities Policy sciences Confidence voting Executive power Comparative studies Cabinet system sug: subj: Majorities Policy sciences Executive Offices Confidence voting Executive power Comparative studies Cabinet system keyword: coalition governance copyrightHolder:Hansard Society copyrightYear:2026 executive power inLanguage:en legislatures parliamentarism publisher:Oxford University Press sameAs:https://dx.doi.org/10.1093/pa/gsaf036 votes of confidence coalition governance copyrightHolder:Hansard Society copyrightYear:2026 executive power inLanguage:en legislatures parliamentarism publisher:Oxford University Press sameAs:https://dx.doi.org/10.1093/pa/gsaf036 votes of confidence ab: Scholars have traditionally considered government-initiated votes of confidence a powerful tool that parliamentary executives can leverage to achieve policy and electoral goals. Yet, these votes remain a relatively understudied procedure, partly because theoretical efforts at making better sense of their use have not been matched by efforts at gathering comparative evidence vis-à-vis their employment. I draw upon new data from 14 parliamentary democracies (1945–2021) to propose a more clear-cut definition and classification of government-initiated votes of confidence, with the goal of refining our understanding of how they are employed in practice. I review the institutional rules (type of vote, initiating power, decision rule, consequences of failure), present some figures on the use of the procedure and cases of failure by country, and distinguish four applications and the related benefits/costs. Two scenarios in which executives can exploit this instrument to facilitate the emergence of or foster cohesion in legislative majorities are identified ("majority-making" and "whipping/cohesive" confidence), as well as two additional ways in which this mechanism can aid executives ("signaling" and "technical" confidence). pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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