Optimality Versus Politics: The Tragedy of the Commons and Mitigating Institutions in COVID-19 Policies.

This article examines the co-production of Non-Medical Interventions during the COVID-19 pandemic as the Tragedy of the Commons among political incumbents in multi-level governance systems. We argue that when policy leadership has political costs, a second-order prisoner's dilemma arises, leading in...

Descripción completa

Detalles Bibliográficos
Publicado en:Publius: The Journal of Federalism Vol. 56; no. 2; pp. 475 - 504
Autores principales: Bayrali, Onsel Gurel, Shvetsova, Olga
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Oxford University Press / USA Spring2026
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
fields @attributes:
  recordID: 1
pdfLink:
plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=192964326&site=ehost-live
header:
  @attributes:
    shortDbName: ssf
    uiTerm: 192964326
    longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson)
    uiTag: AN
  controlInfo:
    bkinfo:
    jinfo:
      jid:
        00485950
        UBL
      jtl: Publius: The Journal of Federalism
      issn: 00485950
      maglogo: N
    pubinfo:
      dt: Spring2026
      vid: 56
      iid: 2
      pid: 622
      pub: Oxford University Press / USA
    artinfo:
      ui:
        192964326
        10.1093/publius/pjaf058
      ppf: 475
      ppct: 29
      formats:
      tig:
        atl: Optimality Versus Politics: The Tragedy of the Commons and Mitigating Institutions in COVID-19 Policies.
      aug:
        au:
          Bayrali, Onsel Gurel
          Shvetsova, Olga
        affil: Binghamton University, Vestal, NY, USA
      su:
        Public health
        COVID-19 pandemic
        Prisoner's dilemma game
        Policy sciences
        Public goods
        Multi-level governance (Theory)
        Institutional environment
      sug:
        subj:
          Public health
          COVID-19 pandemic
          Prisoner's dilemma game
          Policy sciences
          Public goods
          Health and Welfare Funds
          Multi-level governance (Theory)
          Institutional environment
      keyword:
        copyrightHolder:CSF Associates Inc.
        copyrightYear:2026
        crisis management
        federalism
        inLanguage:en
        party systems
        policy co-production
        publisher:Oxford University Press
        regional and central governments
        sameAs:https://dx.doi.org/10.1093/publius/pjaf058
        copyrightHolder:CSF Associates Inc.
        copyrightYear:2026
        crisis management
        federalism
        inLanguage:en
        party systems
        policy co-production
        publisher:Oxford University Press
        regional and central governments
        sameAs:https://dx.doi.org/10.1093/publius/pjaf058
      ab: This article examines the co-production of Non-Medical Interventions during the COVID-19 pandemic as the Tragedy of the Commons among political incumbents in multi-level governance systems. We argue that when policy leadership has political costs, a second-order prisoner's dilemma arises, leading incumbents to strategically withdraw from their jurisdictional responsibilities and shift policy burdens to other levels of government, resulting in the underproduction of policy measures. Drawing on a global dataset, we assess how political institutions and incentives shaped these inefficiencies in different phases of the pandemic. Our findings contribute to the broader understanding of strategic interactions in multi-level governance by demonstrating how jurisdictional authority is not simply assigned but is actively claimed and ceded in response to institutional incentives and structural constraints. In doing so, this research highlights both the governance vulnerabilities of multi-level systems in crisis response and their structural advantages that can prevent extreme policy failures.
      pubtype: Academic Journal
      doctype: Article
      src: R
    language: English
    refInfo:
    copyright:
      @attributes:
        flag: N
    holdings:
      @attributes:
        islocal: N