A Causal Exclusion Problem for Knowledge-First Epistemology.
According to knowledge-first epistemology, knowledge is irreducible to true belief plus something else, and yet knowledge entails belief. Moreover, knowledge plays an ineliminable role in causal explanation of action. This paper develops and defends an entirely new line of reasoning against this vie...
| Published in: | International Journal of Philosophical Studies Vol. 34; no. 2; pp. 148 - 172 |
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| Format: | Article |
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Taylor & Francis Ltd
May2026
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| Online Access: | View this record in EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=193388542&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 193388542 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 09672559 5BE jtl: International Journal of Philosophical Studies issn: 09672559 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: May2026 vid: 34 iid: 2 pid: 377 pub: Taylor & Francis Ltd artinfo: ui: 193388542 10.1080/09672559.2025.2519271 ppf: 148 ppct: 24 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 465KB tig: atl: A Causal Exclusion Problem for Knowledge-First Epistemology. aug: au: Kallestrup, Jesper affil: Department of Philosophy, University of Aberdeen, Aberdeen, UK su: Theory of knowledge Epiphenomenalism Causality (Physics) Realism Rationalism Causal inference Belief & doubt sug: subj: Theory of knowledge Epiphenomenalism Causality (Physics) Realism Rationalism Causal inference Belief & doubt keyword: causal exclusion causal explanation explanatory realism irreducibility of knowldge Knowledge-first epistemology norm of action ab: According to knowledge-first epistemology, knowledge is irreducible to true belief plus something else, and yet knowledge entails belief. Moreover, knowledge plays an ineliminable role in causal explanation of action. This paper develops and defends an entirely new line of reasoning against this view: in conjunction with two independently plausible principles about explanatory realism and causal exclusion, this view leads to the conclusion that beliefs are epiphenomenal in cases of knowledge, which is when and only when action is deemed epistemically rational. Even worse, if a causal criterion of ontological commitment is accepted, it follows that postulating the existence of beliefs in cases of knowledge is redundant. Several specific objections are raised, followed by replies. While the paper does not pretend to exhaust all lines of resistance, the upshot is that the burden is now squarely on friends of knowledge-first epistemology to pursue one or more of these further. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of International Journal of Philosophical Studies is the property of Taylor & Francis Ltd and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: International Journal of Philosophical Studies holder: Taylor & Francis Ltd dt: @attributes: year: 2026 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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