Constructing Embodied Emotion with Language: Moebius Syndrome and Face-Based Emotion Recognition Revisited.
Some embodied theories of concepts state that concepts are represented in a sensorimotor manner, typically via simulation in sensorimotor cortices. Fred Adams (2010) has advanced an empirical argument against embodied concepts reasoning as follows. If concepts are embodied, then patients with certai...
| Published in: | Australasian Journal of Philosophy Vol. 104; no. 1; pp. 36 - 65 |
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| Format: | Article |
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Taylor & Francis Ltd
Mar2026
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| Online Access: | View this record in EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=193526345&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 193526345 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00048402 BHK jtl: Australasian Journal of Philosophy issn: 00048402 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Mar2026 vid: 104 iid: 1 pid: 377 pub: Taylor & Francis Ltd artinfo: ui: 193526345 10.1080/00048402.2025.2500667 ppf: 36 ppct: 29 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 949KB tig: atl: Constructing Embodied Emotion with Language: Moebius Syndrome and Face-Based Emotion Recognition Revisited. aug: au: Gentry, Hunter affil: University of Wisconsin-Madison* su: Emotion recognition Experimental design Mental representation Emotions Sensorimotor cortex Constructivism (Psychology) sug: subj: Emotion recognition Experimental design Mental representation Emotions Sensorimotor cortex Constructivism (Psychology) keyword: Categorization Concepts Embodiment Language Perception ab: Some embodied theories of concepts state that concepts are represented in a sensorimotor manner, typically via simulation in sensorimotor cortices. Fred Adams (2010) has advanced an empirical argument against embodied concepts reasoning as follows. If concepts are embodied, then patients with certain sensorimotor impairments should perform worse on categorization tasks involving those concepts. Adams cites a study with Moebius Syndrome patients that shows typical categorization performance in face-based emotion recognition. Adams concludes that their typical performance shows that embodiment is false. Moebius patients must draw on amodal (non-embodied) emotion concepts. In this paper, I review face-based emotion recognition studies with Moebius patients yielding conflicting results and diagnose these conflicts as a difference in experimental design. When emotion labels are provided, patients have typical performance, but when labels are not provided patients are severely deficient. I then show how an embodied, psychological constructionist view of emotions predicts and explains these performance differences. The upshot is that embodied theories of concepts are vindicated. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Australasian Journal of Philosophy is the property of Taylor & Francis Ltd and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Australasian Journal of Philosophy holder: Taylor & Francis Ltd dt: @attributes: year: 2026 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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