The Space of Reasons as Self-Consciousness.
The premises of a valid argument don't get you to a conclusion unless you have put them together. But what is it for thoughts to be together? I argue that the togetherness of our mental states is constituted by consciousness of ourselves as their common subject. I describe a special sort of necessit...
| Publicado en: | Australasian Journal of Philosophy Vol. 104; no. 1; pp. 282 - 302 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Taylor & Francis Ltd
Mar2026
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=193526354&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 193526354 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00048402 BHK jtl: Australasian Journal of Philosophy issn: 00048402 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Mar2026 vid: 104 iid: 1 pid: 377 pub: Taylor & Francis Ltd artinfo: ui: 193526354 10.1080/00048402.2025.2515855 ppf: 282 ppct: 20 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 462KB tig: atl: The Space of Reasons as Self-Consciousness. aug: au: Marcus, Eric affil: Auburn University su: Self-consciousness (Awareness) Self-deception Cognitive psychology Cognition Epistemics Propositional attitudes Philosophy of mind sug: subj: Self-consciousness (Awareness) Self-deception Cognitive psychology Cognition Epistemics Propositional attitudes Philosophy of mind keyword: Inference Rationality Reason-Responsiveness Self-Consciousness Self-Knowledge Unity of Consciousness ab: The premises of a valid argument don't get you to a conclusion unless you have put them together. But what is it for thoughts to be together? I argue that the togetherness of our mental states is constituted by consciousness of ourselves as their common subject. I describe a special sort of necessity—rational necessity—that links the beliefs $p$ p and $q$ q , when someone infers $q$ q from $p$ p. It is a modal connection between beliefs that is grounded in our understanding of the relation between the topic of those beliefs. But beliefs are only tied together in this manner in so far as I am able to self-ascribe them knowledgeably, yet not on the basis of evidence or observation. When beliefs are integrated, doxastic self-ascription is simply the result of an unobfuscated consciousness of the truth of the relevant propositions. Fragmentation occurs when this capacity is masked, on account of self-deception, distraction, confusion, etc. The capacity to bring thoughts together so that reasoning happens just is the capacity to know what one thinks by thinking it. Self-consciousness is the source of our rationality. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Australasian Journal of Philosophy is the property of Taylor & Francis Ltd and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Australasian Journal of Philosophy holder: Taylor & Francis Ltd dt: @attributes: year: 2026 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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