Does Peirce Beg Questions against Conceptualism?
In a recent paper exploring tensions between Peirce's theory of inquiry and his philosophy of probability, Stewart and Sterkenburg note persistent textual evidence suggesting that Peirce simply dismisses views that construe probabilities in terms of degrees of belief. Though they stop short of accus...
| Publicado en: | Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society Vol. 61; no. 4; pp. 49 - 78 |
|---|---|
| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Editorial |
| Publicado: |
Indiana University Press
Fall2025
|
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=193593780&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 193593780 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00091774 2HR jtl: Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society issn: 00091774 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Fall2025 vid: 61 iid: 4 pid: 211 pub: Indiana University Press artinfo: ui: 193593780 10.2979/csp.00060 ppf: 49 ppct: 29 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 501KB tig: atl: Does Peirce Beg Questions against Conceptualism? aug: au: Kasser, Jeff affil: Colorado State University sug: keyword: Bayesianism Charles S. Peirce Frequentism Induction Probability ab: In a recent paper exploring tensions between Peirce's theory of inquiry and his philosophy of probability, Stewart and Sterkenburg note persistent textual evidence suggesting that Peirce simply dismisses views that construe probabilities in terms of degrees of belief. Though they stop short of accusing Peirce of begging relevant questions, their discussion invites attention to whether Peirce genuinely argues against conceptualist approaches to probability, and if so, how he does so. This paper clarifies Peirce's target, presents the considerations he offers against conceptualism, and assesses them. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Editorial src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society is the property of Indiana University Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society holder: Indiana University Press dt: @attributes: year: 2025 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
|---|