The performance of performance-based contracting in public outsourcing: a meta-regression analysis.

Performance-Based Contracting (PBC) is promoted as a model that improves results, enhances quality, reduces costs, and increases accountability. It has become a standard element of government contracting worldwide and a key component of newer pay-for-success models. However, scholarly evaluations re...

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Publicado en:Journal of Public Administration Research & Theory Vol. 36; no. 2; pp. 250 - 267
Autores principales: Bel, Germà, Espaillat, Pedro, Esteve, Marc
Formato: Literature Review
Publicado: Oxford University Press / USA Apr2026
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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      dt: Apr2026
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        atl: The performance of performance-based contracting in public outsourcing: a meta-regression analysis.
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          Bel, Germà
          Espaillat, Pedro
          Esteve, Marc
        affil:
          Department of Econometrics, Statistics and Applied Economics, Universitat de Barcelona, 08007, Spain
          Department of Society, Politics and Sustainability, Universitat Ramon Llull ESADE, 08034, Spain
          Department of Political Science, University College London, WC1H 9QU, United KingdomDepartment of Global Governance, Universitat Ramon Llull ESADE, 08034, Spain
      su:
        Contracts
        Goal (Psychology)
        Contract theory
        Agency theory
        Public contracts
        Contracting out
        Subcontracting
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        subj:
          Contracts
          Goal (Psychology)
          Contract theory
          Agency theory
          Public contracts
          Contracting out
          Subcontracting
      keyword:
        contracting-out
        copyrightHolder:Public Management Research Association
        copyrightYear:2026
        inLanguage:en
        meta-analysis
        performance-based contract
        public procurement
        publisher:Oxford University Press
        sameAs:https://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jopart/muaf037
        contracting-out
        copyrightHolder:Public Management Research Association
        copyrightYear:2026
        inLanguage:en
        meta-analysis
        performance-based contract
        public procurement
        publisher:Oxford University Press
        sameAs:https://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jopart/muaf037
      ab: Performance-Based Contracting (PBC) is promoted as a model that improves results, enhances quality, reduces costs, and increases accountability. It has become a standard element of government contracting worldwide and a key component of newer pay-for-success models. However, scholarly evaluations remain scattered and often lack a solid theoretical foundation. This study conducts a meta-analysis of 740 observations from 38 studies across 10 service areas to evaluate genuine performance. Utilizing principal–agent, incomplete-contract, and goal-setting theories, we examine what influences the performance of PBC. By combining these perspectives within a single empirical framework, the paper offers a systematic test of core assumptions about incentive alignment, contract incompleteness, and goal design in public contracting. Results indicate that outcome-focused contracts are more successful than those targeting process- or output-based results. This finding provides quantitative evidence supporting incomplete-contract theory's claim that performance depends on the contractibility of outcomes and extends principal–agent logic by demonstrating when and why incentives fail in multidimensional public settings. Although context matters, factors such as residual control, collaboration, and shared goals are central to PBC success. The study thus makes a theoretical contribution by bridging economic and behavioral contracting theories and empirically grounding their predictions in public-sector evidence.
      pubtype: Academic Journal
      doctype: Literature Review
      src: R
    language: English
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