How do public agencies respond to budgetary control? A theory of strategic task portfolios in public administration.
How do public agencies manage diverse programs under limited budgets? Resource constraints force agencies to prioritize tasks, requiring strategic decisions about how to allocate resources effectively. In this article, I develop a game-theoretical model that explores how agencies shape and restructu...
| Published in: | Journal of Public Administration Research & Theory Vol. 36; no. 2; pp. 281 - 299 |
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| Format: | Article |
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Oxford University Press / USA
Apr2026
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| Online Access: | View this record in EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=193631229&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 193631229 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 10531858 172N jtl: Journal of Public Administration Research & Theory issn: 10531858 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Apr2026 vid: 36 iid: 2 pid: 622 pub: Oxford University Press / USA artinfo: ui: 193631229 10.1093/jopart/muag001 ppf: 281 ppct: 18 formats: tig: atl: How do public agencies respond to budgetary control? A theory of strategic task portfolios in public administration. aug: au: Lee, Jonghoon affil: Taipei School of Economics and Political Science, National Tsing Hua University, Hsinchu, Taiwan su: United States. Dept. of Justice. Antitrust Division Resource allocation Government agencies Public administration Game theory Budget management Antitrust violation lawsuits Key performance indicators (Management) sug: subj: Resource allocation Government agencies Public administration Game theory United States. Dept. of Justice. Antitrust Division Other federal government public administration Other General Government Support Other local, municipal and regional public administration Other provincial and territorial public administration Budget management Antitrust violation lawsuits Key performance indicators (Management) keyword: antitrust budgetary control compositional analysis copyrightHolder:Public Management Research Association copyrightYear:2026 inLanguage:en multitask framework publisher:Oxford University Press regulatory agency sameAs:https://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jopart/muag001 antitrust budgetary control compositional analysis copyrightHolder:Public Management Research Association copyrightYear:2026 inLanguage:en multitask framework publisher:Oxford University Press regulatory agency sameAs:https://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jopart/muag001 ab: How do public agencies manage diverse programs under limited budgets? Resource constraints force agencies to prioritize tasks, requiring strategic decisions about how to allocate resources effectively. In this article, I develop a game-theoretical model that explores how agencies shape and restructure their task portfolios under budgetary constraints. In response to budget reductions, I argue that agencies reallocate resources by prioritizing more efficient tasks for improved performance within their portfolios. To test my theoretical claims, I analyze an original dataset of antitrust cases filed by the US Antitrust Division (AD) from 1970 to 2019. Using compositional analysis, I find systematic associations between budgetary changes and the AD's litigation portfolios. Specifically, budget cuts are associated with a higher share of antitrust criminal cases—the most efficient type for improving performance metrics—and with relatively lower shares for other case types. This study offers new insight into how public agencies navigate budgetary constraints to achieve their public missions while meeting performance expectations. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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