A case for a Keynesian–Schumpeterian problem-solving central banking: Bridging the law-practice gap.
In recent years, central banks have significantly altered their practices, widening the law–practice gap between their formal legal mandates and their actual policy conduct. Monetary conservatives call for a return to the old consensus on economic and constitutional grounds, whereas monetary populis...
| Publicado en: | Cambridge Journal of Economics Vol. 50; no. 3; pp. 495 - 515 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Oxford University Press / USA
May2026
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=194186930&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 194186930 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 0309166X CEC jtl: Cambridge Journal of Economics issn: 0309166X maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: May2026 vid: 50 iid: 3 pid: 622 pub: Oxford University Press / USA artinfo: ui: 194186930 10.1093/cje/beag012 ppf: 495 ppct: 20 formats: tig: atl: A case for a Keynesian–Schumpeterian problem-solving central banking: Bridging the law-practice gap. aug: au: Krampf, Arie su: Technocracy Liberalism Economic policy Keynesian economics Central banking industry Monetary policy sug: subj: Technocracy Liberalism Economic policy Keynesian economics Monetary Authorities-Central Bank Central banking industry Monetary policy keyword: Central Bank Independence (CBI) copyrightHolder:Cambridge Political Economy Society copyrightYear:2026 independence-as-conservatism independence-as-rules independence-as-separateness inLanguage:en post-Keynesian economics problem-solving central banking publisher:Oxford University Press sameAs:https://dx.doi.org/10.1093/cje/beag012 Schumpeterian technocracy supply-side theories of democracy Central Bank Independence (CBI) copyrightHolder:Cambridge Political Economy Society copyrightYear:2026 independence-as-conservatism independence-as-rules independence-as-separateness inLanguage:en post-Keynesian economics problem-solving central banking publisher:Oxford University Press sameAs:https://dx.doi.org/10.1093/cje/beag012 Schumpeterian technocracy supply-side theories of democracy ab: In recent years, central banks have significantly altered their practices, widening the law–practice gap between their formal legal mandates and their actual policy conduct. Monetary conservatives call for a return to the old consensus on economic and constitutional grounds, whereas monetary populists call for the re-politicisation of money by returning monetary powers to elected officials. Although these positions oppose each other, both regard the current configuration as illegitimate because it departs from the governing principles of liberal democracy, regardless of its economic effectiveness. While economists have recognised the economic merits of this configuration, the political and legal criticism levelled against it by conservatives and populists has remained unanswered. This article offers such an answer. It contends that the present configuration of central banking is best understood as reflecting a Keynesian–Schumpeterian problem-solving model: independent yet activist, separate from government but not bound by rigid rules. The article argues that this model represents the most reasonable compromise between the legal and constitutional constraints of liberal democracies, the non-ergodicity of capitalist economies, and the shortcomings of representative democracy. This model draws on post-Keynesian economic assumptions, supply-side theories of democracy, and a Schumpeterian notion of technocracy. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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