Luck-based versus merit-based income shifts fairness perceptions and promotes cooperation in a public goods game.

We experimentally study the impact of merit- and luck-based inequalities on cooperative behaviour and fairness perceptions. Using a sample from non-student populations (N  = 542), we examine behaviour in one-shot public good games (PGG) in treatments where individuals' income is randomly allocated (...

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Publicado en:Oxford Economic Papers Vol. 78; no. 2; pp. 335 - 350
Autores principales: Drouvelis, Michalis, Qiu, Zeyu
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Oxford University Press / USA Apr2026
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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      dt: Apr2026
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        10.1093/oep/gpaf033
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        atl: Luck-based versus merit-based income shifts fairness perceptions and promotes cooperation in a public goods game.
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        au:
          Drouvelis, Michalis
          Qiu, Zeyu
        affil:
          Department of Economics, University of Birmingham, Edgbaston, Birmingham B15 2TT, United KingdomCESifo, Munich, Germany
          Department of Economics and Public Policy, Imperial College London, South Kensington Campus, London SW7 2AZ, United Kingdom
      su:
        Income inequality
        Cooperation
        Prosocial behavior
        Fairness
        Public goods
        Experimental economics
      sug:
        subj:
          Income inequality
          Cooperation
          Prosocial behavior
          Fairness
          Public goods
          Experimental economics
      keyword:
        C92
        cooperation
        copyrightHolder:Oxford University Press
        copyrightYear:2026
        D07
        fairness perceptions
        H41
        income inequality
        inLanguage:en
        online experiment
        publisher:Oxford University Press
        sameAs:https://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oep/gpaf033
        sources of inequality
        C92
        cooperation
        copyrightHolder:Oxford University Press
        copyrightYear:2026
        D07
        fairness perceptions
        H41
        income inequality
        inLanguage:en
        online experiment
        publisher:Oxford University Press
        sameAs:https://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oep/gpaf033
        sources of inequality
      ab: We experimentally study the impact of merit- and luck-based inequalities on cooperative behaviour and fairness perceptions. Using a sample from non-student populations (N  = 542), we examine behaviour in one-shot public good games (PGG) in treatments where individuals' income is randomly allocated ('Luck') or performance dependent ('Merit'). In line with our theoretical framework, we find that groups with merit-based inequality contribute less to the public goods than groups with luck-based inequality. To explore the underlying mechanism, we elicit fairness judgments from the perspective of a neutral, uninvolved arbitrator. Individuals in groups with merit-based inequality perceive it fairer to cooperate less, and these fairness perceptions account for their lower contributions. The effect on cooperation and fairness perceptions is driven primarily by rich individuals in merit-based societies. Our findings provide causal evidence that the source of inequality shapes cooperation through perceived fairness, with important implications for policy making targeted at promoting public good contributions.
      pubtype: Academic Journal
      doctype: Article
      src: R
    language: English
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