Global public good agreements with fixed costs.
International cooperation to provide global public goods is often weak: coalitions tend to be small, or, when large coalitions form, the resulting welfare gains are limited—a result known as the 'paradox of cooperation'. We revisit this issue by analyzing a two-stage coalition formation game in whic...
| Publicado en: | Oxford Economic Papers Vol. 78; no. 2; pp. 487 - 511 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Oxford University Press / USA
Apr2026
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=194211916&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 194211916 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00307653 OXE jtl: Oxford Economic Papers issn: 00307653 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Apr2026 vid: 78 iid: 2 pid: 622 pub: Oxford University Press / USA artinfo: ui: 194211916 10.1093/oep/gpag005 ppf: 487 ppct: 24 formats: tig: atl: Global public good agreements with fixed costs. aug: au: Finus, Michael Furini, Francesco affil: Department of Economics, Karl-Franzens-Universität Graz, Universitätsstraße 15/F4, Graz, 8010, Austria Department of Socioeconomics, Universität Hamburg, Welckerstraße 8, Hamburg, 20354, Germany su: Public goods International cooperation Coalitions Game theory Cooperation Overhead costs sug: subj: Public goods International cooperation Coalitions Game theory Cooperation Overhead costs keyword: C72 coalition stability copyrightHolder:Oxford University Press copyrightYear:2026 D62 fixed costs global public good provision H41 H87 inLanguage:en international treaties publisher:Oxford University Press Q50 sameAs:https://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oep/gpag005 C72 coalition stability copyrightHolder:Oxford University Press copyrightYear:2026 D62 fixed costs global public good provision H41 H87 inLanguage:en international treaties publisher:Oxford University Press Q50 sameAs:https://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oep/gpag005 ab: International cooperation to provide global public goods is often weak: coalitions tend to be small, or, when large coalitions form, the resulting welfare gains are limited—a result known as the 'paradox of cooperation'. We revisit this issue by analyzing a two-stage coalition formation game in which contributing to a global public good involves not only variable costs but also fixed upfront costs. This cost structure fundamentally alters cooperation incentives. Fixed costs can generate corner provision outcomes and qualitatively different coalition formation scenarios. Depending on their magnitude, fixed costs can alter the 'paradox of cooperation' by making broad and effective international agreements both stable and welfare-enhancing. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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