A rent-seeking perspective on imperial peace.
I model a rent-seeking contest among two "identity ideologues," differentially located along an identity continuum, and a "kleptocrat," who can choose any location in-between. The contest jointly awards an identity-relevant good (religion) and an identity-irrelevant good (money). The kleptocrat valu...
| Publicado en: | Oxford Economic Papers Vol. 78; no. 2; pp. 540 - 560 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Oxford University Press / USA
Apr2026
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=194211918&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 194211918 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00307653 OXE jtl: Oxford Economic Papers issn: 00307653 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Apr2026 vid: 78 iid: 2 pid: 622 pub: Oxford University Press / USA artinfo: ui: 194211918 10.1093/oep/gpag007 ppf: 540 ppct: 20 formats: tig: atl: A rent-seeking perspective on imperial peace. aug: au: Dasgupta, Indraneel affil: Economic Research Unit, Indian Statistical Institute, 203 Barrackpore Trunk Road, Kolkata, 700108, IndiaIZA—Institute of Labor Economics, Bonn, Germany su: Imperialism Ethnic conflict Identity (Psychology) Resource exploitation Peace Rent seeking Peacebuilding sug: subj: Imperialism Ethnic conflict Identity (Psychology) Resource exploitation Peace Rent seeking Peacebuilding keyword: balance and rule copyrightHolder:Oxford University Press copyrightYear:2026 D72 D74 decolonization ethnic conflict identitarian distance imperial peace inLanguage:en publisher:Oxford University Press rent-seeking contest sameAs:https://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oep/gpag007 balance and rule copyrightHolder:Oxford University Press copyrightYear:2026 D72 D74 decolonization ethnic conflict identitarian distance imperial peace inLanguage:en publisher:Oxford University Press rent-seeking contest sameAs:https://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oep/gpag007 ab: I model a rent-seeking contest among two "identity ideologues," differentially located along an identity continuum, and a "kleptocrat," who can choose any location in-between. The contest jointly awards an identity-relevant good (religion) and an identity-irrelevant good (money). The kleptocrat values only money, the ideologues value both money and religion. The ideologues are worse off when the winner is located farther away. The kleptocrat can be arbitrarily more successful in the contest than the ideologues, even with a cost disadvantage. A decline in the kleptocrat's cost of contest effort reduces conflict. Both ideologues lose in success probability, but gain in expected utility. Elimination of the kleptocrat increases conflict and makes the ideologues more successful yet worse off. My results rationalize "imperial peace" despite "imperial drain"—peace and stability within multi-ethnic empires despite significant resource extraction, and explain why imperial collapse is often associated with a sharp escalation in ethnic violence. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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