Private finance initiatives and outsourcing of facilities management in UK hospitals.

A substantial share of hospital expenditure is devoted to hard facilities management in building maintenance, and soft services such as catering, cleaning, laundry, waste management, and security. This article examines how these services are delivered—insourced or outsourced—under traditional procur...

Descripción completa

Detalles Bibliográficos
Publicado en:Oxford Economic Papers Vol. 78; no. 2; pp. 585 - 612
Autores principales: Podaneva, Alena, Picard, Pierre M
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Oxford University Press / USA Apr2026
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
fields @attributes:
  recordID: 1
pdfLink:
plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=194211920&site=ehost-live
header:
  @attributes:
    shortDbName: ssf
    uiTerm: 194211920
    longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson)
    uiTag: AN
  controlInfo:
    bkinfo:
    jinfo:
      jid:
        00307653
        OXE
      jtl: Oxford Economic Papers
      issn: 00307653
      maglogo: N
    pubinfo:
      dt: Apr2026
      vid: 78
      iid: 2
      pid: 622
      pub: Oxford University Press / USA
    artinfo:
      ui:
        194211920
        10.1093/oep/gpag009
      ppf: 585
      ppct: 27
      formats:
      tig:
        atl: Private finance initiatives and outsourcing of facilities management in UK hospitals.
      aug:
        au:
          Podaneva, Alena
          Picard, Pierre M
        affil:
          Centre for Health Economics, University of York, Heslington, York, YO10 5DD, United Kingdom
          Department of Economics and Management, University of Luxembourg, 4, rue Alphonse Weicker, Luxembourg, L-2721, LuxembourgCORE/LIDAM, UCLouvain, Voie du Roman Pays 34, Louvain-la-Neuve, B-1348, Belgium
      su:
        United Kingdom
        Private Finance Initiative
        Hospitals
        Facility management
        Contracting out
        Quality of service
        Hospital costs
        Corporate purchasing
        Operational risk
        Public-private sector cooperation
      sug:
        subj:
          Hospitals
          United Kingdom
          Private Finance Initiative
          Lessors of Nonresidential Buildings (except Miniwarehouses)
          General Medical and Surgical Hospitals
          General (except paediatric) hospitals
          Facility management
          Contracting out
          Quality of service
          Hospital costs
          Corporate purchasing
          Operational risk
          Public-private sector cooperation
      keyword:
        bundling
        copyrightHolder:Oxford University Press
        copyrightYear:2026
        D86
        facilities management services
        foundation trusts
        hospitals
        I11
        I18
        incomplete contracts
        inLanguage:en
        L32
        moral hazard
        outsourcing
        private finance initiatives
        publisher:Oxford University Press
        sameAs:https://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oep/gpag009
        bundling
        copyrightHolder:Oxford University Press
        copyrightYear:2026
        D86
        facilities management services
        foundation trusts
        hospitals
        I11
        I18
        incomplete contracts
        inLanguage:en
        L32
        moral hazard
        outsourcing
        private finance initiatives
        publisher:Oxford University Press
        sameAs:https://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oep/gpag009
      ab: A substantial share of hospital expenditure is devoted to hard facilities management in building maintenance, and soft services such as catering, cleaning, laundry, waste management, and security. This article examines how these services are delivered—insourced or outsourced—under traditional procurement and Private Finance Initiative (PFI) arrangements. We show that PFIs create incentives to internalize externalities between construction and maintenance while encouraging outsourcing to specialized providers to mitigate operational risks. Under traditional procurement, builders' warranties generate reverse moral hazard by increasing their exposure to future maintenance problems. The analysis characterizes the choice between PFIs and traditional procurement as a trade-off between moral hazard arising from outsourcing, warranty provisions, and operational risks associated with maintenance and soft services. PFIs are preferred when hard facilities management risks are either very low or very high, whereas traditional procurement is optimal when service quality is critical, maintenance risks are moderate, and warranties are limited.
      pubtype: Academic Journal
      doctype: Article
      src: R
    language: English
    refInfo:
    copyright:
      @attributes:
        flag: N
    holdings:
      @attributes:
        islocal: N