Naturalism, Normativity, and Reasons.
Marko Jurjako's recent monograph, Normative Reasons from a Naturalistic Point of View, is an engaging defence of a naturalistic meta-ethics. The book's specific focus is on normative reasons, which it understands along subjectivist lines. In my contribution to this symposium, my primary aim is to cl...
| Publicado en: | Prolegomena: Journal of Philosophy Vol. 25; no. 1; pp. 15 - 39 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Society for the Advancement of Philosophy
2026
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=194661236&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 194661236 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 13334395 4UNN jtl: Prolegomena: Journal of Philosophy issn: 13334395 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: 2026 vid: 25 iid: 1 pid: 37835 pub: Society for the Advancement of Philosophy artinfo: ui: 194661236 10.26362/20260102 ppf: 15 ppct: 24 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 1.5MB tig: atl: Naturalism, Normativity, and Reasons. aug: au: TANYI, ATTILA affil: Department of Philosophy, University of Milan, Via Festa del Perdono, 7, 20122 Milano, Italy su: Naturalism Metaethics Subjectivity Parfit, Derek, 1942-2017 Normativity (Ethics) sug: subj: Naturalism Metaethics Subjectivity Parfit, Derek, 1942-2017 Normativity (Ethics) keyword: Derek Parfit dispositionalism dispozicionalizam evolucija evolution idealizacija idealization naturalism naturalizam normativity normativnost razlozi reasons subjectivism subjektivizam dispozicionalizam evolucija idealizacija naturalizam normativnost razlozi subjektivizam ab: Marko Jurjako's recent monograph, Normative Reasons from a Naturalistic Point of View, is an engaging defence of a naturalistic meta-ethics. The book's specific focus is on normative reasons, which it understands along subjectivist lines. In my contribution to this symposium, my primary aim is to clarify some of the positions taken by Jurjako and to point out possible problems with them with an eye on further developing these positions. This does not mean that I agree with his naturalistic meta-ethics; nonetheless, I do see it as a major contender in today's meta-ethical landscape. I interpret Jurjako as being a naturalist in meta-ethics, not only methodologically, but also substantively. However, as I try to show, this does not come clearly forward from the book even though the book explicitly endorses naturalism. Along the way I also make some critical remarks about Jurjako's treatment of Enoch's idealization challenge and his use of Street's evolutionary debunking argument. Nedavna monografija Marka Jurjaka, Normative Reasons from a Naturalistic Point of View, uvjerljiva je obrana naturalističke metaetike. Knjiga se posebno usredotočuje na normativne razloge, koje tumači u subjektivističkom duhu. U doprinosu ovom simpoziju moj je primarni cilj razjasniti neka od stajališta koja Jurjako zauzima te ukazati na moguće probleme s njima, s namjerom daljnjeg razvijanja tih stajališta. To ne znači da se slažem s njegovom naturalističkom metaetikom; ipak, smatram je jednim od glavnih kandidata u današnjem metaetičkom krajoliku. Jurjaka tumačim kao naturalista u metaetici ne samo u metodološkom nego i sadržajnom smislu. Međutim, kako nastojim pokazati, iz knjige to ne dolazi jasno do izražaja, iako knjiga eksplicitno podržava naturalizam. Usput iznosim i neke kritičke primjedbe o Jurjakovoj obradi Enochova izazova idealizacije te njegovu korištenju Streetina evolucijskog argumenta razotkrivanja. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Prolegomena: Journal of Philosophy is the property of Society for the Advancement of Philosophy and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Prolegomena: Journal of Philosophy holder: Society for the Advancement of Philosophy dt: @attributes: year: 2026 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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