Naturalism and Normativity: A Critical Examination of the Subject-Based Model of Reasons.
This paper critically examines Marko Jurjako's naturalistic, subject-based theory of normative reasons. Grounded in the idea that reasons arise from evolutionarily shaped cognitive capacities that regulate behaviour, Jurjako aims to account for normativity without invoking robust realism. Four relat...
| Publicado en: | Prolegomena: Journal of Philosophy Vol. 25; no. 1; pp. 51 - 64 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Society for the Advancement of Philosophy
2026
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| Sumario: | This paper critically examines Marko Jurjako's naturalistic, subject-based theory of normative reasons. Grounded in the idea that reasons arise from evolutionarily shaped cognitive capacities that regulate behaviour, Jurjako aims to account for normativity without invoking robust realism. Four related concerns are highlighted: (1) explaining reasons via adaptive utility does not settle the open question argument; (2) the biological dual-function model leaves open how it captures the pragmatic and semantic variety of normative language; (3) the subject-based framework could clarify how it distinguishes correct from mistaken reasoning within an idealised perspective; and (4) the naturalistic account explains detection but not how this capacity meets standards of epistemic justification. Overall, while Jurjako's approach convincingly shows why we believe in reasons and how they function motivationally, it remains incomplete as an account of their evaluative force and linguistic complexity. Ovaj rad kritički ispituje Jurjakovu naturalističku teoriju normativnih razloga utemeljenu na subjektu. Oslanjajući se na ideju da razlozi proizlaze iz evolucijski oblikovanih kognitivnih sposobnosti koje reguliraju ponašanje, Jurjako nastoji objasniti normativnost bez pozivanja na snažni realizam. Istaknute su četiri međusobno povezane nedoumice: (1) objašnjavanje razlogā putem adaptivne korisnosti ne rješava argument otvorenog pitanja; (2) biološki model dvostruke funkcije ostavlja otvorenim pitanje kako on obuhvaća pragmatičku i semantičku raznolikost normativnog jezika; (3) okvir utemeljen na subjektu mogao bi razjasniti kako on razlikuje ispravno od pogrešnog zaključivanja unutar idealizirane perspektive; (4) naturalističko objašnjenje objašnjava detekciju, ali ne i to kako ta sposobnost zadovoljava standarde epistemičkog opravdanja. Općenito, iako Jurjakov pristup uvjerljivo pokazuje zašto vjerujemo u razloge i kako oni funkcioniraju motivacijski, on ostaje nepotpun kao objašnjenje njihove evaluativne snage i jezične složenosti. |
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