A Defense of Institutional Conscience Rights for Secular Hospitals: Philosophical Justifications and Practical Applications.
We have previously argued that clinicians should leverage conscience, rather than quasi-objective clinical standards, to justify their refusal to provide aggressive interventions to patients who were likely permanently unconscious. Such a move sidesteps perennial disagreements over concepts such as...
| Publicado en: | American Journal of Bioethics Vol. 26; no. 7; pp. 45 - 59 |
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| Autores principales: | , , |
| Formato: | questions and answers Journal Article |
| Publicado: |
Taylor & Francis Ltd
Jul2026
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ccm&AN=194782885&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ccm uiTerm: 194782885 longDbName: CINAHL Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: dissinfo: jinfo: jid: 15265161 FKZ jtl: American Journal of Bioethics issn: 15265161 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Jul2026 vid: 26 iid: 7 pid: 377 pub: Taylor & Francis Ltd place: Philadelphia, Pennsylvania artinfo: ui: 194782885 189273958 194782885 194782885 10.1080/15265161.2025.2570673 194782885 ppf: 45 ppct: 14 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P tig: atl: A Defense of Institutional Conscience Rights for Secular Hospitals: Philosophical Justifications and Practical Applications. aug: au: Wasserman, Jason Adam Brummett, Abram Navin, Mark Christopher affil: Oakland University William Beaumont School of Medicine sug: subj: Conscience Hospitals Ethics, Organizational Philosophy, Medical Ethics, Medical Brain Death Persistent Vegetative State Medical Futility Ethics Committees Patient Rights Life Support Care Treatment Withdrawal Refusal to Treat ab: We have previously argued that clinicians should leverage conscience, rather than quasi-objective clinical standards, to justify their refusal to provide aggressive interventions to patients who were likely permanently unconscious. Such a move sidesteps perennial disagreements over concepts such as "futility," "harm," and "best interest"; and it is consistent with the growing acknowledgement of value pluralism in healthcare. In this paper, we make similar arguments about the conscience rights of institutions. We argue that, like individuals, healthcare organizations can leverage conscience claims to justify institution-wide prohibitions on some medical interventions that are legal and within the standard of care. Of course, faith-based healthcare institutions already enjoy institutional conscience protections. We argue that secular institutions can also claim conscience protections to refuse some kinds of interventions on the basis of system-level moral commitments. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: questions and answers Journal Article ougenre: Article language: English refInfo: holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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