Does science undermine the theistic multiverse?

I examine the claim that theistic and scientific multiverses conflict: the former require that only universes above a certain threshold of value exist, while the latter make no such stipulations. I explore several avenues of reconciliation: appealing to ceteris peribus conditions, redefining 'univer...

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Publicado en:Erkenntnis Vol. 91; no. 4; pp. 1765 - 1793
Autor principal: Donahue, Miles K.
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Springer Nature Apr2026
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Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        atl: Does science undermine the theistic multiverse?
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        au: Donahue, Miles K.
        affil: https://ror.org/052gg0110 St. Cross College, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK
      su:
        Multiverse theory
        Divine providence
        Philosophy of science
        Skepticism
        Philosophical theology
        Good & evil
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          Multiverse theory
          Divine providence
          Philosophy of science
          Skepticism
          Philosophical theology
          Good & evil
      ab: I examine the claim that theistic and scientific multiverses conflict: the former require that only universes above a certain threshold of value exist, while the latter make no such stipulations. I explore several avenues of reconciliation: appealing to ceteris peribus conditions, redefining 'universe' in the philosophical context, advocating skeptical theism, contending that God and gratuitous evil are compatible, and adjusting the relevant scientific theories. I conclude that only the last strategy is viable, as long as we grant the coherence of a Molinist account of divine providence. If successful, it would entail that scientific and theistic models conflict only superficially. If not, however, then the theistic multiverse is inconsistent with its scientific counterparts.
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    language: English
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