Solving the Partition Problem: Signaling Games and the Cost-Based Perception Model.

Signaling games have been widely used as a powerful theoretical tool for investigating the propositional content of signals in the evolution of language and communication. Although significant progress has been made, information-theoretic approaches to content within the sender-receiver framework fa...

Descripción completa

Detalles Bibliográficos
Publicado en:Erkenntnis Vol. 91; no. 4; pp. 2035 - 2063
Autores principales: Wang, Jidong, Zhang, Mingjun
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Springer Nature Apr2026
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
fields @attributes:
  recordID: 1
pdfLink:
plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=194808489&site=ehost-live
header:
  @attributes:
    shortDbName: hlh
    uiTerm: 194808489
    longDbName: Humanities International Complete
    uiTag: AN
  controlInfo:
    bkinfo:
    jinfo:
      jid:
        01650106
        5KZ
      jtl: Erkenntnis
      issn: 01650106
      maglogo: N
    pubinfo:
      dt: Apr2026
      vid: 91
      iid: 4
      pid: 237
      pub: Springer Nature
    artinfo:
      ui:
        194808489
        10.1007/s10670-025-00979-9
      ppf: 2035
      ppct: 28
      formats:
        fmt:
          – @attributes:
              type: T
          – @attributes:
              type: P
              size: 1.3MB
      tig:
        atl: Solving the Partition Problem: Signaling Games and the Cost-Based Perception Model.
      aug:
        au:
          Wang, Jidong
          Zhang, Mingjun
        affil: https://ror.org/013q1eq08 School of Philosophy, Fudan University, Room 2519, Guanghua West Main Building, 220 Handan Road, Shanghai, China
      su:
        Reinforcement learning
        Game theory
        Communication models
        Information theory
      sug:
        subj:
          Reinforcement learning
          Game theory
          Communication models
          Information theory
      ab: Signaling games have been widely used as a powerful theoretical tool for investigating the propositional content of signals in the evolution of language and communication. Although significant progress has been made, information-theoretic approaches to content within the sender-receiver framework face what Jonathan Birch calls the "partition problem." In this article, we address this problem by integrating signaling games with cost-based perception to model the internal state of an organism as it perceives objects in its environment. We propose a simple model that shows how an organism can spontaneously learn to partition external states in different ways through reinforcement learning, thereby offering a promising solution to the partition problem.
      pubtype: Academic Journal
      doctype: Article
      src: R
    language: English
    refInfo:
    copyright:
      @attributes:
        flag: Y
      custom: Erkenntnis is a copyright of Springer, 2026. All Rights Reserved.
      item: Erkenntnis
      holder: Springer Nature
      dt:
        @attributes:
          year: 2026
    holdings:
      @attributes:
        islocal: N