Studying artificial affect: the case of pain.

I motivate the systematic study of artificial affect by arguing that its possibility has significant intellectual, practical, and ethical implications. I argue the extant consciousness-centric approaches fail to address these implications, while behavioral approaches to AI sentience fail to address...

Descripción completa

Detalles Bibliográficos
Publicado en:Inquiry Vol. 69; no. 6; pp. 2896 - 2918
Autor principal: Henke, Benjamin
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Taylor & Francis Ltd Jul2026
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
fields @attributes:
  recordID: 1
pdfLink:
plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=194937563&site=ehost-live
header:
  @attributes:
    shortDbName: hlh
    uiTerm: 194937563
    longDbName: Humanities International Complete
    uiTag: AN
  controlInfo:
    bkinfo:
    jinfo:
      jid:
        0020174X
        B8P
      jtl: Inquiry
      issn: 0020174X
      maglogo: N
    pubinfo:
      dt: Jul2026
      vid: 69
      iid: 6
      pid: 377
      pub: Taylor & Francis Ltd
    artinfo:
      ui:
        194937563
        10.1080/0020174X.2025.2556747
      ppf: 2896
      ppct: 22
      formats:
      tig:
        atl: Studying artificial affect: the case of pain.
      aug:
        au: Henke, Benjamin
        affil:
          Department of Computing, Imperial College London, London, UK
          School of Advanced Study, Institute of Philosophy, University of London, London, UK
      su:
        Affective computing
        Suffering
        Pragmatism
        Phenomenology
        Conscious automata
        Human behavior models
      sug:
        subj:
          Affective computing
          Suffering
          Pragmatism
          Phenomenology
          Conscious automata
          Human behavior models
      ab: I motivate the systematic study of artificial affect by arguing that its possibility has significant intellectual, practical, and ethical implications. I argue the extant consciousness-centric approaches fail to address these implications, while behavioral approaches to AI sentience fail to address the inherent gaming problem in behavioral approaches to AI mentality. In place of these approaches, I propose a functional approach focusing on the roles that affective states play within a cognitive economy. I exemplify this approach with the case of bodily pain by examining its constituent sensory, evaluative, and motivational functions. This analysis establishes the tractability of a functional approach to artificial pain while also highlighting several outstanding questions that must be answered before we can settle the question whether artificial pain is possible in near-future AI systems.
      pubtype: Academic Journal
      doctype: Article
      src: R
    language: English
    refInfo:
    copyright:
      @attributes:
        flag: Y
      dt:
        @attributes:
          year: 2026
    holdings:
      @attributes:
        islocal: N