Dual anchors in the shadow of the future: how renewal expectations and relational history govern behavior in public contracts.
This study extends relational contract theory by showing how behavioral reference points can be established through policy. We theorize that contracts are governed by dual anchors: backward-looking relational history and forward-looking renewal expectations. Analyzing 430 public legal service contra...
| Publicado en: | Journal of Public Administration Research & Theory Vol. 36; no. 3; pp. 329 - 343 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Oxford University Press / USA
Jul2026
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=194993810&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 194993810 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 10531858 172N jtl: Journal of Public Administration Research & Theory issn: 10531858 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Jul2026 vid: 36 iid: 3 pid: 622 pub: Oxford University Press / USA artinfo: ui: 194993810 10.1093/jopart/muag010 ppf: 329 ppct: 14 formats: tig: atl: Dual anchors in the shadow of the future: how renewal expectations and relational history govern behavior in public contracts. aug: au: Malatesta, Deanna Cheema, Faisal Saeed affil: O'Neill School of Public & Environmental Affairs, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN, United States su: Public contracts Contract theory Corporate purchasing sug: subj: Public contracts Contract theory Corporate purchasing keyword: contracts-as-reference-point copyrightHolder:Public Management Research Association copyrightYear:2026 inLanguage:en public procurement publisher:Oxford University Press rate increases relational contracting renewal expectations sameAs:https://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jopart/muag010 shadow of the future contracts-as-reference-point copyrightHolder:Public Management Research Association copyrightYear:2026 inLanguage:en public procurement publisher:Oxford University Press rate increases relational contracting renewal expectations sameAs:https://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jopart/muag010 shadow of the future ab: This study extends relational contract theory by showing how behavioral reference points can be established through policy. We theorize that contracts are governed by dual anchors: backward-looking relational history and forward-looking renewal expectations. Analyzing 430 public legal service contracts using Heckman selection models, we find relational history increases prices in amendments, revealing its "dark side." A nonbinding renewal clause, however, significantly attenuates this effect, reducing price increase probability by up to 37 percentage points. These findings resolve the puzzle that renewal clauses, though present in fewer than half of contracts, disproportionately appear in amended agreements. The clause does not guarantee renewal but alters behavioral logic, transforming the supplier's reference point from backward-looking entitlement to forward-looking relationship preservation. Our findings provide microfoundations for how institutions structure relational dynamics and demonstrate how procurement design can shape expectations to improve outcomes. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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