Why moral judgements change across variations of trolley‐like problems.
In the standard 'trolley problem', respondents must decide whether to save a condemned group of individuals by sacrificing a safe bystander. Although respondents often are willing to sacrifice the bystander in some circumstances (e.g., by pulling a lever), they are loath to sacrifice the bystander i...
| Publicado en: | British Journal of Psychology Vol. 117; no. 3; pp. 809 - 840 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Aug2026
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=195289511&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 195289511 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00071269 BJP jtl: British Journal of Psychology issn: 00071269 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Aug2026 vid: 117 iid: 3 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 195289511 10.1111/bjop.12782 ppf: 809 ppct: 31 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: C – @attributes: type: P size: 2MB tig: atl: Why moral judgements change across variations of trolley‐like problems. aug: au: Cohen, Dale J. Quinlan, Philip T. affil: Department of Psychology, University of North Carolina at Wilmington, Wilmington North Carolina,, USA Department of Psychology, University of York, Heslington, York, UK su: Decision making Ethics Psychology Analysis of variance Judgment (Psychology) Conceptual models T-test (Statistics) Experimental design Conceptual structures Theory Reaction time Regression analysis sug: subj: Decision making Ethics Psychology Analysis of variance Judgment (Psychology) Conceptual models T-test (Statistics) Experimental design Conceptual structures Theory Reaction time Regression analysis keyword: computational modelling Dual Process Theory Psychological Values Theory sacrificial moral dilemmas trolley problems computational modelling Dual Process Theory Psychological Values Theory sacrificial moral dilemmas trolley problems ab: In the standard 'trolley problem', respondents must decide whether to save a condemned group of individuals by sacrificing a safe bystander. Although respondents often are willing to sacrifice the bystander in some circumstances (e.g., by pulling a lever), they are loath to sacrifice the bystander in others (e.g., by pushing the bystander off a footbridge). This difference in responding has been explained via a Dual Process theory of moral judgements (DPT). DPT, however, is a classic boxes‐and‐arrows model that only makes directional predictions. Meehl (1967, Philosophy of Science, 34, 103) cautioned against theories that only make directional predictions, explaining that they are notoriously difficult to falsify. Meehl (1967, Philosophy of Science, 34, 103) argued that researchers should follow the lead of Physics and develop computational models that make functional and point predictions. Here, we use a value‐based, computational cognitive model of decision‐making (Psychological Value Theory) to predict precisely both the speed and kind of response in trolley‐like problems in three experiments. We show that this model accounts for the changes in choices across variations of the trolley problem with a response bias parameter. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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