Federalism by Extortion.
A distinctive feature of the second Trump administration has been its use of extortion tactics to force compliance with its political agenda. In its dealings with universities, law firms, and media outlets, a new mode of governance has emerged. By threatening to cut funds, withhold regulatory approv...
| Publicado en: | Publius: The Journal of Federalism Vol. 56; no. 3; pp. 579 - 599 |
|---|---|
| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Oxford University Press / USA
Summer2026
|
| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=195587493&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 195587493 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00485950 UBL jtl: Publius: The Journal of Federalism issn: 00485950 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Summer2026 vid: 56 iid: 3 pid: 622 pub: Oxford University Press / USA artinfo: ui: 195587493 10.1093/publius/pjag010 ppf: 579 ppct: 20 formats: tig: atl: Federalism by Extortion. aug: au: Hamburger, Jacob affil: Marquette University Law School, Eckstein Hall, PO Box 1881, Milwaukee, WI 53201-1881, USA su: United States Extortion Federal government Intergovernmentalism Bargaining power Political agenda Presidential administrations Legal doctrines sug: subj: Extortion Federal government United States Intergovernmentalism Bargaining power Political agenda Presidential administrations Legal doctrines keyword: copyrightHolder:CSF Associates Inc. copyrightYear:2026 immigration inLanguage:en political economy presidency/executive publisher:Oxford University Press sameAs:https://dx.doi.org/10.1093/publius/pjag010 state politics/subnational politics copyrightHolder:CSF Associates Inc. copyrightYear:2026 immigration inLanguage:en political economy presidency/executive publisher:Oxford University Press sameAs:https://dx.doi.org/10.1093/publius/pjag010 state politics/subnational politics ab: A distinctive feature of the second Trump administration has been its use of extortion tactics to force compliance with its political agenda. In its dealings with universities, law firms, and media outlets, a new mode of governance has emerged. By threatening to cut funds, withhold regulatory approval, or initiate civil or criminal enforcement, the government aims to pressure its targets into bilateral "deals" on the administration's terms, and to induce others to follow suit. This article examines how this approach has shaped intergovernmental relations, producing "federalism by extortion." Although transactional dealmaking is not new to US federalism, constitutional principles limit the federal government's ability to coerce state and local action. In theory, these doctrines offer sub-federal governments stronger protections from extortion than private entities. Yet the administration and its congressional allies have repeatedly raised the cost of noncompliance, revealing a political economy in which federalism's safeguards appear weaker than assumed. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
|---|