The State of American Federalism 2025–2026: Federalism's Dual Role in Democratic Backsliding.
This introductory article argues that American federalism's relationship to democratic backsliding is conditional, bidirectional, and mechanism-dependent. Building on recent studies, we develop a framework identifying when federalism protects democracy and when it facilitates erosion, while specifyi...
| Publicado en: | Publius: The Journal of Federalism Vol. 56; no. 3; pp. 539 - 579 |
|---|---|
| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Oxford University Press / USA
Summer2026
|
| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=195587502&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 195587502 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00485950 UBL jtl: Publius: The Journal of Federalism issn: 00485950 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Summer2026 vid: 56 iid: 3 pid: 622 pub: Oxford University Press / USA artinfo: ui: 195587502 10.1093/publius/pjag029 ppf: 539 ppct: 40 formats: tig: atl: The State of American Federalism 2025–2026: Federalism's Dual Role in Democratic Backsliding. aug: au: Dichio, Michael Bromley-Trujillo, Rebecca affil: Department of Political Science, University of Utah, Salt Lake City, UT 84112, USA Department of Political Science, Christopher Newport University, Newport News, VA 23606, USA su: Federal government Actions & defenses (Law) Sociocultural factors Civil rights Democratic backsliding Political geography Apportionment (Election law) Election officials sug: subj: Federal government Actions & defenses (Law) Sociocultural factors Civil rights Democratic backsliding Political geography Apportionment (Election law) Election officials keyword: copyrightHolder:CSF Associates Inc. copyrightYear:2026 democratic backsliding federalism inLanguage:en publisher:Oxford University Press sameAs:https://dx.doi.org/10.1093/publius/pjag029 United States copyrightHolder:CSF Associates Inc. copyrightYear:2026 democratic backsliding federalism inLanguage:en publisher:Oxford University Press sameAs:https://dx.doi.org/10.1093/publius/pjag029 United States ab: This introductory article argues that American federalism's relationship to democratic backsliding is conditional, bidirectional, and mechanism-dependent. Building on recent studies, we develop a framework identifying when federalism protects democracy and when it facilitates erosion, while specifying how it does so through three mechanisms: litigation, political safeguards, and cultural supports. The empirical record from 2025 to 2026 illustrates that these mechanisms operate simultaneously, often within the same state and through the same institutions. We examine election administration, redistricting, and policy geography across several issue areas, finding that federalism both blocked acute national threats and enabled ongoing subnational erosion. The analysis reveals that protection is strongest when mechanisms reinforce each other, that state capacity variation amplifies divergence across the federation, and that executive strategies of fiscal extortion, administrative fragmentation, and personal legal jeopardy against subnational officials are testing the limits of federalism's safeguards against democratic backsliding. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
|---|