KELAM VE İSLAM FELSEFESİ ETKİLEŞİMİ BAĞLAMINDA NASÎRÜDDİN TÛSÎ'NİN MÜCERRET AKIL YORUMU.
The article examines Nasir al-Din Tusi’s interpretation of the abstract intellect in the context of the interaction between Islamic theology (kalam) and philosophy. While Tusi accepts the existence of the abstract intellect as the necessary locus of the "commanding self" (nafs al-amr), which is the...
| Publicado en: | Dinbilimleri Journal Vol. 26; no. 2; pp. 1281 - 1305 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Dinbilimleri Journal
haz2026
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| Sumario: | The article examines Nasir al-Din Tusi’s interpretation of the abstract intellect in the context of the interaction between Islamic theology (kalam) and philosophy. While Tusi accepts the existence of the abstract intellect as the necessary locus of the "commanding self" (nafs al-amr), which is the epistemological foundation of knowledge and truth, he rejects the hierarchy of multiple intellects based on the emanation theory of the Islamic Peripatetic philosophers; instead, he develops a singular model of the abstract intellect grounded in God’s absolute will and direct creation. In this model, the abstract intellect is positioned not as an ontological necessity but as a possible and eternal being; the idea of necessary intermediary beings between God and the world is criticized and rejected. Furthermore, Tusi argues that the multiplicity in the abstract intellect arises not from individual entities but from the diversity of universal concepts contained within the intellect. As a result, Tusi’s approach presents an original and coherent metaphysical framework within Islamic thought by reinterpreting philosophical concepts in light of theological principles. Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī's interpretation of the abstract intellect (al-ʿaql al-mujarrad) constitutes a remarkable example of the interaction between Peripatetic Islamic philosophy and the kalām tradition. In the literature, al-Ṭūsī's conception of the abstract intellect has often been treated either as a mere continuation of the Peripatetic emanationist system or within the framework of a theological refutation; consequently, the specific epistemological and ontological justifications through which he reconstructed this concept have not been sufficiently elucidated. This article aims to examine al-Ṭūsī's approach in the context of his establishing a strong dialogue with the philosophical tradition to reinterpret certain fundamental concepts based on kalām principles, and his specific departure from the Peripatetics regarding the abstract intellect, thereby filling this conceptual gap in the literature. The study employs a method of textual and comparative analysis, focusing on the author's fundamental works such as Ithbāt al-ʿAql al-Mujarrad and Tajrīd al-Iʿtiqād. The primary findings of the article are as follows: al-Ṭūsī grounds the existence of the abstract intellect by identifying it as the necessary locus (maḥall) of nafs al-amr, which serves as the epistemological foundation of truth. He demonstrates that certain (yaqīnī) judgments can only be true through correspondence with an external, immutable, and non-corporeal reality. Arguing that this reality can be neither a body, nor an accident, nor an Idea, al-Ṭūsī concludes that it can only be understood as forms residing in an abstract intellect. While this acceptance regarding the existence of the abstract intellect brings al-Ṭūsī onto common ground with Islamic philosophers, it distinguishes him from this tradition concerning the origin of the abstract intellect and its relationship with God. al-Ṭūsī rejects the chain of abstract intellects based on the theory of emanation (ṣudūr) and the notion of these intellects as necessary ontological intermediaries between God and the world, on the grounds that they are incompatible with God's absolute will and freedom in creation. Within this framework, he critiques the Peripatetic principle that "from one, only one proceeds" and the conception of God as a necessary agent by essence (mūjib bi-dh-dhāt). In conclusion, the abstract intellect is removed from being a necessary link in the chain of emanation, and the universe is grounded as the direct and volitional act of God. Accordingly, the study demonstrates that al-Ṭūsī proposes an original model of an abstract intellect that is singular in essence, in place of the Peripatetic scheme of hierarchical intellects. |
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