Cosmic-Perdurantism.

Perdurantists hold that persons have temporal parts. But which of the objects is conscious—persons, their temporal parts, both? In this paper, I argue that Perdurantists have good metaphysical motivation to believe that, strictly speaking, it is the cosmos and only the cosmos that exhibits conscious...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Publicado en:Australasian Journal of Philosophy Vol. 104; no. 2; pp. 521 - 536
Autor principal: Longenecker, Michael Tze-Sung
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Taylor & Francis Ltd Jun2026
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Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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Sumario:Perdurantists hold that persons have temporal parts. But which of the objects is conscious—persons, their temporal parts, both? In this paper, I argue that Perdurantists have good metaphysical motivation to believe that, strictly speaking, it is the cosmos and only the cosmos that exhibits consciousness—hence, strictly speaking, neither persons nor their temporal parts are conscious. I argue for such Cosmic-Perdurantism by arguing that only the cosmos exhibits mass, and pairing this claim with reductive physicalism about the mind.