Virtual Objects: To Be is to Be Perceivable.
The objects we interact with in virtual reality—virtual objects—raise metaphysical questions. The most central of these questions is whether virtual objects really exist, that is, whether we ought to be realists about such objects. The most prominent realist metaphysics of virtual objects is David C...
| Publicado en: | Australasian Journal of Philosophy Vol. 104; no. 2; pp. 461 - 483 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Taylor & Francis Ltd
Jun2026
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=195834762&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 195834762 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00048402 BHK jtl: Australasian Journal of Philosophy issn: 00048402 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Jun2026 vid: 104 iid: 2 pid: 377 pub: Taylor & Francis Ltd artinfo: ui: 195834762 10.1080/00048402.2025.2521039 ppf: 461 ppct: 22 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 542KB tig: atl: Virtual Objects: To Be is to Be Perceivable. aug: au: Murphy, Alex affil: University College London su: Realism Virtual reality Ontology Metaphysics Perception (Philosophy) Phenomenalism sug: subj: Realism Virtual reality Ontology Metaphysics Perception (Philosophy) Phenomenalism keyword: Virtual Digitalism Virtual Objects Virtual Perceptibilism Virtual Reality ab: The objects we interact with in virtual reality—virtual objects—raise metaphysical questions. The most central of these questions is whether virtual objects really exist, that is, whether we ought to be realists about such objects. The most prominent realist metaphysics of virtual objects is David Chalmers' virtual digitalism—the view that virtual objects are digital objects. I propose an alternative realist account—virtual perceptibilism. On this view virtual objects are pure perceptibilia. They are public objects, like rainbows, whose existence and intrinsic nature is dependent on us as perceivers. I contrast perceptibilism with digitalism, showing the superiority of the former. As such, I demonstrate that virtual perceptibilism is the best virtual realism on offer, leaving aside the question of whether perceptibilism is superior to irrealist accounts. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Australasian Journal of Philosophy is the property of Taylor & Francis Ltd and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Australasian Journal of Philosophy holder: Taylor & Francis Ltd dt: @attributes: year: 2026 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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