Humeanism, Modality, and the Governing Conception of Natural Laws.
A common objection against Humean reductionism about laws is an argument from governing: It is natural to think that laws of nature govern. But in order to govern the laws need to be independent of the phenomena they govern. Hence, Humean laws, which reduce to patterns in the phenomena and so lack t...
| Publicado en: | Australasian Journal of Philosophy Vol. 104; no. 2; pp. 557 - 575 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Taylor & Francis Ltd
Jun2026
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=195834763&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 195834763 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00048402 BHK jtl: Australasian Journal of Philosophy issn: 00048402 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Jun2026 vid: 104 iid: 2 pid: 377 pub: Taylor & Francis Ltd artinfo: ui: 195834763 10.1080/00048402.2025.2521041 ppf: 557 ppct: 18 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 492KB tig: atl: Humeanism, Modality, and the Governing Conception of Natural Laws. aug: au: Jaag, Siegfried Loew, Christian affil: Heinrich Heine Universität Düsseldorf Umeå Universitet su: Physical laws Scientific models Reductionism Theory (Philosophy) Necessity (Philosophy) Philosophy of science sug: subj: Physical laws Scientific models Reductionism Theory (Philosophy) Necessity (Philosophy) Philosophy of science keyword: Best Systems Account Governing Humeanism about Laws Laws of Nature Modality Scientific Modelling ab: A common objection against Humean reductionism about laws is an argument from governing: It is natural to think that laws of nature govern. But in order to govern the laws need to be independent of the phenomena they govern. Hence, Humean laws, which reduce to patterns in the phenomena and so lack this independence, cannot govern. A standard Humean response to this argument is that we should not place much weight on the intuition that laws govern. Non-Humeans, however, reply that the argument does not merely rest on intuitions but that scientific practice presupposes governing. In this paper, we offer a response to this revised challenge to Humeanism by giving a detailed account of the laws' role in scientific modelling. We argue that while Humean theories indeed cannot capture certain governing-intuitions, they still can make sense of those aspects of science that allegedly motivate governing. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Australasian Journal of Philosophy is the property of Taylor & Francis Ltd and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Australasian Journal of Philosophy holder: Taylor & Francis Ltd dt: @attributes: year: 2026 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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