When to Fill Responsibility Gaps: A Proposal.
This article examines the concept of "responsibility gaps," defined as situations where traditional theories of moral responsibility fail to attribute appropriate responsibility for harms caused, resulting in a mismatch between philosophically justified and intuitive responsibility attributions. It...
| Publicado en: | Journal of Value Inquiry Vol. 60; no. 3; pp. 595 - 621 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Sep2026
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=195844526&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 195844526 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00225363 OJ8 jtl: Journal of Value Inquiry issn: 00225363 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Sep2026 vid: 60 iid: 3 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 195844526 10.1007/s10790-024-10011-y ppf: 595 ppct: 26 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 732KB tig: atl: When to Fill Responsibility Gaps: A Proposal. aug: au: Da Silva, Michael affil: https://ror.org/01ryk1543 University of Southampton, Southampton, UK su: Responsibility Normativity (Ethics) Agent (Philosophy) Apologizing Artificial intelligence & ethics Compensation (Law) sug: subj: Responsibility Normativity (Ethics) Agent (Philosophy) Apologizing Artificial intelligence & ethics Compensation (Law) ab: This article examines the concept of "responsibility gaps," defined as situations where traditional theories of moral responsibility fail to attribute appropriate responsibility for harms caused, resulting in a mismatch between philosophically justified and intuitive responsibility attributions. It proposes six conditions under which such gaps should be "filled"—that is, when an entity not fully responsible under standard accounts should nonetheless be called upon to address responsibility-relevant harms to fulfill key moral functions like blame, compensation, or apology. These conditions include the presence of non-trivial harm, the acceptability or inevitability of the gap-producing circumstances, the ability to address the harm, the furthering of a responsibility-relevant moral good, the identification of a suitable candidate to fill the gap, and the absence of alternative means to achieve the relevant moral ends. The article emphasizes that filling responsibility gaps is a non-ideal, exceptional measure distinct from legal liability or full moral responsibility and argues against filling all gaps indiscriminately, highlighting the importance of careful normative analysis across diverse domains such as AI, corporate agency, and group decision-making. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Journal of Value Inquiry is a copyright of Springer, 2026. All Rights Reserved. item: Journal of Value Inquiry holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2026 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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