Precis of inquiry under bounds.
The article focuses on developing a theory of bounded rationality that addresses how agents with limited cognitive abilities and costly inquiry processes can rationally form intentions, preferences, and beliefs. It contrasts the traditional Standard Picture of rationality, which emphasizes structura...
| Publicado en: | Philosophical Studies Vol. 183; no. 8; pp. 2287 - 2291 |
|---|---|
| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Book Review |
| Publicado: |
Springer Nature
Aug2026
|
| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=196027811&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 196027811 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318116 4L8 jtl: Philosophical Studies issn: 00318116 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Aug2026 vid: 183 iid: 8 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 196027811 10.1007/s11098-025-02402-z ppf: 2287 ppct: 4 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 415KB tig: atl: Precis of inquiry under bounds. aug: au: Thorstad, David affil: https://ror.org/02vm5rt34 Vanderbilt University, PMB 406319 2301, Vanderbilt Place, 37240, Nashville, TN, USA su: Bounded rationality Consequentialism (Ethics) Heuristic Rationalism Epistemics Cognition Philosophy of mind Theory of knowledge sug: subj: Bounded rationality Consequentialism (Ethics) Heuristic Rationalism Epistemics Cognition Philosophy of mind Theory of knowledge ab: The article focuses on developing a theory of bounded rationality that addresses how agents with limited cognitive abilities and costly inquiry processes can rationally form intentions, preferences, and beliefs. It contrasts the traditional Standard Picture of rationality, which emphasizes structural consistency, with bounded rationality’s process-focused, ecological, and heuristic-based approach. Central to the article is the reason-responsive consequentialist view of rational inquiry, which holds that inquiry is rational when it promotes the most value in response to reasons grounded in an agent’s total evidence. The article argues against the existence of distinct epistemic norms of inquiry and uses this view to explain and vindicate many observed deviations from classical rationality norms, proposing a nuanced relationship between bounded rationality and the Standard Picture. Finally, it situates this procedural turn in rationality within broader philosophical debates, including the zetetic turn in epistemology, emphasizing inquiry over static attitudes. pubtype: Review doctype: Book Review src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Philosophical Studies is a copyright of Springer, 2026. All Rights Reserved. item: Philosophical Studies holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2026 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
|---|