Dualization of corporate control: lifetimers, external appointees, and CEO succession in Japan.
We investigate mechanisms of institutional stability under profound environmental change, using corporate control in Japan as a critical case. Building on the concept of dualization in the comparative institutions literature, we theorize how dualized power relations at the top of the firm sustain in...
| Publicado en: | Social Forces Vol. 105; no. 1; pp. 120 - 145 |
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| Autores principales: | , , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Oxford University Press / USA
Sep2026
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=196060159&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 196060159 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00377732 SFR jtl: Social Forces issn: 00377732 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Sep2026 vid: 105 iid: 1 pid: 622 pub: Oxford University Press / USA artinfo: ui: 196060159 10.1093/sf/soaf226 ppf: 120 ppct: 25 formats: tig: atl: Dualization of corporate control: lifetimers, external appointees, and CEO succession in Japan. aug: au: Jung, Jiwook Mun, Eunmi Ono, Hiroshi affil: School of Labor and Employment Relations, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, Champaign, IL, United States Hitotsubashi University, Chiyoda-ku, Japan keyword: copyrightHolder:University of North Carolina Chapel Hill copyrightYear:2026 economic sociology inLanguage:en organizations/management publisher:Oxford University Press sameAs:https://dx.doi.org/10.1093/sf/soaf226 work/labor process copyrightHolder:University of North Carolina Chapel Hill copyrightYear:2026 economic sociology inLanguage:en organizations/management publisher:Oxford University Press sameAs:https://dx.doi.org/10.1093/sf/soaf226 work/labor process ab: We investigate mechanisms of institutional stability under profound environmental change, using corporate control in Japan as a critical case. Building on the concept of dualization in the comparative institutions literature, we theorize how dualized power relations at the top of the firm sustain insider control. Using data on executive board members of all non-financial firms listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange from 1993 to 2016, we show that "lifetimers"—employees who spend their entire careers with a single company—continue to enjoy substantial advantages in CEO succession. They maintain their dominance by promoting fellow lifetimers and constraining the prospects of other candidates. At the same time, "external appointees"—organizational outsiders who join the firm directly as executive board members—also benefit from their institutional ties and boundary-spanning roles. Yet, unlike lifetimers, their relative advantages are fragile, as they lack durable intra-firm power bases and are more exposed to shifting external conditions and internal politics. Our findings suggest that resistance by organizational insiders, combined with the selective co-optation of outsiders, can help preserve institutional arrangements in a changing environment. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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