Thugs-for-Hire: The Rise and Fall of Political–Criminal Co-Governance in Rural China.

In political–criminal co-governance, governments and gangs share authority and collaborate to implement policy. This article draws on empirical data to investigate partnerships between local governments and rural gangs in many Chinese villages. It argues that insufficient finance, limited compliance...

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Publicado en:British Journal of Criminology Vol. 66; no. 5; pp. 959 - 977
Autores principales: Wang, Jingyi, Wang, Peng
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Oxford University Press / USA Sep2026
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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          Wang, Jingyi
          Wang, Peng
        affil:
          Faculty of Law, Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China
          Department of Sociology, University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China
      su:
        China
        Local government
        Gangs
        Civil society
        Crime prevention
        Intimidation
        Policy analysis
        Rural conditions
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          Local government
          Gangs
          Civil society
          Crime prevention
          Intimidation
          Policy analysis
          Rural conditions
          China
      keyword:
        copyrightHolder:Centre for Crime and Justice Studies (formerly ISTD)
        copyrightYear:2026
        informal coercion
        inLanguage:en
        political–criminal co-governance
        publisher:Oxford University Press
        rural gangs
        sameAs:https://dx.doi.org/10.1093/bjc/azaf040
        state–crime relations
        thugs-for-hire
        copyrightHolder:Centre for Crime and Justice Studies (formerly ISTD)
        copyrightYear:2026
        informal coercion
        inLanguage:en
        political–criminal co-governance
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        rural gangs
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        state–crime relations
        thugs-for-hire
      ab: In political–criminal co-governance, governments and gangs share authority and collaborate to implement policy. This article draws on empirical data to investigate partnerships between local governments and rural gangs in many Chinese villages. It argues that insufficient finance, limited compliance from villagers and public policy that lacks social legitimacy have compelled township and village governments to use informal coercion via gangsters and adopt political–criminal co-governance to implement unpopular policies and pursue local interests. It also explores how far China's most recent anti-crime campaign has led to the demise of this type of co-governance in the countryside, enhancing understanding of thugs-for-hire and state–crime relations.
      pubtype: Academic Journal
      doctype: Article
      src: R
    language: English
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