Competing art auctions.
This paper examines the optimal choices of two competing auction houses, where each one is able to choose its own auction date so that the auctions run either simultaneously, sequentially, or with an overlap. We show that simultaneously running auctions, per se , is an optimal choice for each house....
| Publicado en: | Oxford Economic Papers Vol. 78; no. 3; pp. 894 - 915 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Oxford University Press / USA
Jul2026
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=196419352&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 196419352 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00307653 OXE jtl: Oxford Economic Papers issn: 00307653 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Jul2026 vid: 78 iid: 3 pid: 622 pub: Oxford University Press / USA artinfo: ui: 196419352 10.1093/oep/gpag010 ppf: 894 ppct: 21 formats: tig: atl: Competing art auctions. aug: au: Greve, Thomas Keiding, Hans affil: External Faculty Member of CEEPR at MIT, ISCTE-IUL, Av. das Forças Armadas, Lisbon, 1649-026, Portugal University of Copenhagen, Øster Farimagsgade 5, building 26, Copenhagen K, DK-1353, Denmark su: Auctions Equilibrium Auction houses Collections Bidding strategies sug: subj: All other miscellaneous store retailers (except beer and wine-making supplies stores) All Other Miscellaneous Store Retailers (except Tobacco Stores) Auctions Equilibrium Auction houses Collections Bidding strategies keyword: art auctions competing auctions copyrightHolder:Oxford University Press copyrightYear:2026 D43 D44 D82 inLanguage:en L21 optimal competing auctions overlapping auctions publisher:Oxford University Press sameAs:https://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oep/gpag010 sequential auctions simultaneous auctions art auctions competing auctions copyrightHolder:Oxford University Press copyrightYear:2026 D43 D44 D82 inLanguage:en L21 optimal competing auctions overlapping auctions publisher:Oxford University Press sameAs:https://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oep/gpag010 sequential auctions simultaneous auctions ab: This paper examines the optimal choices of two competing auction houses, where each one is able to choose its own auction date so that the auctions run either simultaneously, sequentially, or with an overlap. We show that simultaneously running auctions, per se , is an optimal choice for each house. However, if we fix the supply of objects for sale, then the effects of this simultaneity disappear, and the houses choose arbitrary dates. If the sellers' supply of objects to the auction house is taken into account, then overlapping auctions will be the equilibrium outcome and the optimising behaviour of the auction houses. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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