Semi-collusion and innovation: friends or foes?
It is commonly held that firms engaging in collusive activities adversely affect firms' R&D incentives and social welfare. With a stochastic non-tournament R&D competition, we argue that this pessimistic view does not necessarily hold when firms collude in production but compete in other non-product...
| Publicado en: | Oxford Economic Papers Vol. 78; no. 3; pp. 915 - 935 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Oxford University Press / USA
Jul2026
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=196419364&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 196419364 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00307653 OXE jtl: Oxford Economic Papers issn: 00307653 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Jul2026 vid: 78 iid: 3 pid: 622 pub: Oxford University Press / USA artinfo: ui: 196419364 10.1093/oep/gpag022 ppf: 915 ppct: 20 formats: tig: atl: Semi-collusion and innovation: friends or foes? aug: au: Basak, Debasmita Mukherjee, Arijit affil: Department of Industrial Economics, Nottingham University Business School, Jubilee Campus, Wollaton Road, Nottingham NG8 1BB, United Kingdom su: Welfare economics Economic competition Collusion New product development Process optimization sug: subj: Welfare economics Economic competition Marketing Consulting Services Collusion New product development Process optimization keyword: collusion copyrightHolder:Oxford University Press copyrightYear:2026 inLanguage:en L10 L13 O31 publisher:Oxford University Press sameAs:https://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oep/gpag022 stochastic R&D welfare collusion copyrightHolder:Oxford University Press copyrightYear:2026 inLanguage:en L10 L13 O31 publisher:Oxford University Press sameAs:https://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oep/gpag022 stochastic R&D welfare ab: It is commonly held that firms engaging in collusive activities adversely affect firms' R&D incentives and social welfare. With a stochastic non-tournament R&D competition, we argue that this pessimistic view does not necessarily hold when firms collude in production but compete in other non-production activities, such as R&D. This phenomenon is known as semi-collusion. Adopting a unified R&D model that encompasses both product and process R&D, we show that if the probability of success in R&D is relatively high (low), semi-collusion may provide higher (lower) innovation incentives compared to a non-cooperative setting when the firms invest in process innovation. The innovation incentives are strictly higher under semi-collusion when the firms invest in product innovation. Additionally, we find that regardless of the type of innovation (process or product R&D), semi-collusion may improve social welfare when the firms compete in prices and the goods are close substitutes. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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