| Sumario: | This article investigates the efficacy of raising tax rates on housing property and reducing mortgage repayment deductibility as macroprudential instruments to curb household indebtedness. We analyze the output and welfare implications of these measures, with a particular emphasis on the role of revenue allocation. Utilizing a dynamic general equilibrium framework, we find that while both instruments successfully reduce house prices and credit, raising tax rates on housing property induces more significant price contractions and higher short-run output costs. In contrast, reducing mortgage repayment deductibility is more targeted, effectively lowering mortgage default rates and minimizing collateral erosion. Welfare outcomes depend crucially on fiscal recycling: allocating revenues to public investment or debt reduction primarily benefits patient households, whereas directing revenues toward transfer payments mitigates the welfare losses of credit-constrained borrowers and maximizes benefits for renters by alleviating liquidity constraints.
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