| Sumario: | The article provides an overview and critical engagement with Michael Pelczar's book *Phenomenalism*, which argues that reality consists fundamentally of potentials for experience rather than mind-independent physical objects. Pelczar reverses the traditional explanation by claiming that the possibility of experiences explains physical things, not vice versa, and develops a detailed phenomenalist account addressing challenges such as perceptual relativity, the publicness of objects, and the structure of spacetime. The book also explores the relationship between phenomenalism and scientific realism, the mind–body problem, and perception, proposing a novel worldview that situates experientiality centrally without positing a categorical grounding for modal facts. While the article acknowledges the philosophical richness and originality of Pelczar’s work, it raises concerns about whether phenomenalism truly offers a simpler or more attractive ontology than materialism or idealism, noting that potentials for experience may be as ontologically substantial as traditional entities. Overall, the book is recommended for those researching metaphysics, perception, and the nature of reality.
|
|---|