| Sumario: | The article examines the contribution of social rights to the modern construction of subjective freedom. First, it reconstructs the rationality of liberal law, grounded in the abstract subject, formal equality, and market autonomy, and subsequently identifies three contradictions that emerge with the advent of the social question: the formalistic and self-referential closure of law, the concealment of material inequalities, and the hollowing out of freedoms into mere formal capacities. On this basis, a normative reconstruction is mobilized to isolate the ethical-normative rationality of social rights and to show how they emerge as a response to the limits of liberal law in interpreting and governing the social question. Social rights anchor law in the social causality obscured by liberal formalism and open up the possibility of intervening in a solidaristic and egalitarian manner in the arrangements of social production and reproduction. The article then identifies the main contemporary factors contributing to the crisis of social rights--individualization, juridification, and competitive reconfiguration--and argues that any reformulation of social rights aimed at addressing these factors must preserve their ethicalnormative autonomy and the political-collective dimension of the subjects who claim them. This is indispensable to maintaining their capacity to transform social arrangements and, in accordance with their ethical-normative rationality, to contribute to the preservation and development of subjective freedom.
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