Basic Rules of Arithmetic.

Inferential expressivism makes a systematic distinction between inferences that are valid qua preserving commitment and inferences that are valid qua preserving evidence. I argue that the characteristic inferences licensed by the principle of comprehension, from $x$ x is $P$ P to $x$ x is in the ext...

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Publicado en:Australasian Journal of Philosophy Vol. 104; no. 3; pp. 654 - 673
Autor principal: Schloeder, Julian J.
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Taylor & Francis Ltd Sep2026
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        atl: Basic Rules of Arithmetic.
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        au: Schloeder, Julian J.
        affil: University of Connecticut, Storrs
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      keyword:
        comprehension
        Frege
        inferential expressivism
        logicism
        Russell's paradox
      ab: Inferential expressivism makes a systematic distinction between inferences that are valid qua preserving commitment and inferences that are valid qua preserving evidence. I argue that the characteristic inferences licensed by the principle of comprehension, from $x$ x is $P$ P to $x$ x is in the extension of $P$ P and vice versa, fail to preserve evidence, but do preserve commitment. Taking this observation into account allows one to phrase inference rules for unrestricted comprehension without running into Russell's paradox. In the resulting logic, one can derive full second-order arithmetic. Thus, it is possible to derive classical arithmetic in a consistent logic with unrestricted comprehension.
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    language: English
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