Inductive Incompleteness.
Nelson Goodman cast the ‘problem of induction’ as the task of articulating the principles and standards by which to distinguish valid from invalid inductive inferences. This paper explores some logical bounds on the ability of a rational reasoner to accomplish this task. By a simple argument, either...
| Published in: | Philosophical Studies Vol. 128; no. 1; pp. 109 - 136 |
|---|---|
| Main Author: | |
| Format: | Article |
| Published: |
Springer Nature
Mar2006
|
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | View this record in EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=19785706&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 19785706 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318116 4L8 jtl: Philosophical Studies issn: 00318116 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Mar2006 vid: 128 iid: 1 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 19785706 10.1007/s11098-005-4059-6 ppf: 109 ppct: 27 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 293KB tig: atl: Inductive Incompleteness. aug: au: Hild, Matthias affil: Darden Business School , 100 Darden Blvd Charlottesville 22903-1760 USA su: Induction (Logic) Inference (Logic) Logic Reasoning Game theory sug: subj: Induction (Logic) Inference (Logic) Logic Reasoning Game theory ab: Nelson Goodman cast the ‘problem of induction’ as the task of articulating the principles and standards by which to distinguish valid from invalid inductive inferences. This paper explores some logical bounds on the ability of a rational reasoner to accomplish this task. By a simple argument, either an inductive inference method cannot admit its own fallibility, or there exists some non-inferable hypothesis whose non-inferability the method cannot infer (violating the principle of ‘negative introspection’). The paper discusses some implications of this limited self-knowledge for the justifiability of inductive inferences, auto-epistemic logic, and the epistemic foundations of game theory. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Philosophical Studies is a copyright of Springer, 2006. All Rights Reserved. item: Philosophical Studies holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2006 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
|---|