Rationality and Value: The Epistemological Role of Indeterminate and Agent-dependent Values.
An important trend in contemporary epistemology centers on elaborating an old idea of pragmatist pedigree: theory selection (and in general the process of changing view and fixing beliefs) presupposes epistemic values. This article focuses on analyzing the case where epistemic values are indetermina...
| Publicado en: | Philosophical Studies Vol. 128; no. 1; pp. 7 - 49 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Mar2006
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=19785710&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 19785710 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318116 4L8 jtl: Philosophical Studies issn: 00318116 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Mar2006 vid: 128 iid: 1 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 19785710 10.1007/s11098-005-4051-1 ppf: 7 ppct: 42 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 369KB tig: atl: Rationality and Value: The Epistemological Role of Indeterminate and Agent-dependent Values. aug: au: Costa, Horacio affil: Carnegie Mellon University , 135 Baker Hall Pittsburgh 15213 USA su: Theory of knowledge Reason Values (Ethics) Intellect Philosophy sug: subj: Theory of knowledge Reason Values (Ethics) Intellect Philosophy ab: An important trend in contemporary epistemology centers on elaborating an old idea of pragmatist pedigree: theory selection (and in general the process of changing view and fixing beliefs) presupposes epistemic values. This article focuses on analyzing the case where epistemic values are indeterminate or when the sources of valuation are multiple (epistemic values like coherence and simplicity need not order options in compatible ways). According to the theory that thus arises epistemic alternatives need not be fully ordered by an underlying notion of information-value and therefore the usual economic techniques of optimization cannot be applied in order to compute optimal contractions. But in cases of this sort it is still rational to maximize, i.e. to deem an option as choosable when it is not known to be worse that any other. We present here basic results about a notion of liberal contraction based on maximizing quasi-orderings. This requires the previous solution of some open problems in the theory of rational choice functions, namely a full characterization of choice functions rationalizable in terms of maximization of quasi-transitive relations. We conclude by discussing the problem of what is the adequate feasible set for calculating maximizing solutions for contraction problems and by considering the epistemological roots of some counterexamples against the most fundamental axioms on choice functions (like α). While the first part of the paper shows how economic insights can be used to improve our understanding of the principles of belief formation and change, this final section reverses this strategy by showing the utility of epistemological insights and techniques for providing invariance conditions capable of regulating the applicability of the pure principles of choice. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Philosophical Studies is a copyright of Springer, 2006. All Rights Reserved. item: Philosophical Studies holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2006 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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