Truthmaking, Recombination, and Facts Ontology.

The idea of truthmakers is important for doing serious metaphysics, since a truthmaker principle can give us important guidance in finding out what we would like to include into our ontology. Recently, David Lewis has argued against Armstrong’s argument that a plausible truthmaker principle requires...

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Publicado en:Philosophical Studies Vol. 128; no. 2; pp. 409 - 441
Autor principal: Hofmann, Frank
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Springer Nature Mar2006
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Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        affil: Department of Philosophy and History , University of Tuebingen , Bursagasse 1 Tuebingen 72070 Germany
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        Truth
        Facts (Philosophy)
        Metaphysics
        Lewis, David
        Ontology
        Principle (Philosophy)
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          Truth
          Facts (Philosophy)
          Metaphysics
          Lewis, David
          Ontology
          Principle (Philosophy)
      ab: The idea of truthmakers is important for doing serious metaphysics, since a truthmaker principle can give us important guidance in finding out what we would like to include into our ontology. Recently, David Lewis has argued against Armstrong’s argument that a plausible truthmaker principle requires us to accept facts. I would like to take a close look at the argument. I will argue in detail that the Humean principle of recombination on which Lewis relies is not plausible (independently of the issue of facts). Then I will show that the right truthmaker principle that vindicates facts is superior to the modified truthmaker principle that Lewis has proposed. This will lead into the topic of being and existence. It turns out that truthmaking and facts are plausible, well suited for one another, and very coherent with a plausible conception of being.
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