TIME TRAVEL, AGENCY, AND NOMIC CONSTRAINT.

The article explores conceptual problems associated with time travel concerning the nature of agency and nomological structure. The existence of such conceptual difficulties does not threaten the logical or physical possibility of time travel. The most rational stance to take regarding time travel m...

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Publicado en:Monist Vol. 88; no. 3; pp. 396 - 413
Autor principal: Stevenson, Gordon Park
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Oxford University Press / USA Jul2005
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        au: Stevenson, Gordon Park
        affil: Trinity College, Hartford
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        Time travel
        Spacetime
        Imaginary voyages
        Philosophy
        Theory of knowledge
        Epistemics
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          Time travel
          Spacetime
          Imaginary voyages
          Philosophy
          Theory of knowledge
          Epistemics
      ab: The article explores conceptual problems associated with time travel concerning the nature of agency and nomological structure. The existence of such conceptual difficulties does not threaten the logical or physical possibility of time travel. The most rational stance to take regarding time travel may be one of epistemic humility, by which is meant a stance involving the admission that conceptual analysis may not constitute a methodology for understanding the physical nature of the world.
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    language: English
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