WHAT'S WRONG WITH INFINITE REGRESSES?

It is almost universally believed that some infinite regresses are vicious, and also almost universally believed that some are benign. In this paper I argue that regresses can be vicious for several different sorts of reasons. Furthermore, I claim that some intuitively vicious regresses do not suffe...

Descripción completa

Detalles Bibliográficos
Publicado en:Metaphilosophy Vol. 32; no. 5; pp. 523 - 539
Autor principal: Nolan, Daniel
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Wiley-Blackwell Oct2001
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
fields @attributes:
  recordID: 1
pdfLink:
plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=20426994&site=ehost-live
header:
  @attributes:
    shortDbName: hlh
    uiTerm: 20426994
    longDbName: Humanities International Complete
    uiTag: AN
  controlInfo:
    bkinfo:
    jinfo:
      jid:
        00261068
        9OM
      jtl: Metaphilosophy
      issn: 00261068
      maglogo: Y
    pubinfo:
      dt: Oct2001
      vid: 32
      iid: 5
      pid: 480
      pub: Wiley-Blackwell
    artinfo:
      ui:
        20426994
        10.1111/1467-9973.00206
      ppf: 523
      ppct: 16
      formats:
        fmt:
          @attributes:
            type: P
            size: 120KB
      tig:
        atl: WHAT'S WRONG WITH INFINITE REGRESSES?
      aug:
        au: Nolan, Daniel
        affil: Philosophy Department, 541 Hall of Languages, Syracuse University, Syracuse, NY 13244-1170, USA
      su:
        Philosophical analysis
        Vicious circle principle (Logic)
        Reasoning
        Intuition
        Reductionism
        Irrationalism (Philosophy)
        Form (Logic)
        Methodology
        Theory
      sug:
        subj:
          Philosophical analysis
          Vicious circle principle (Logic)
          Reasoning
          Intuition
          Reductionism
          Irrationalism (Philosophy)
          Form (Logic)
          Methodology
          Theory
      keyword:
        infinity
        parsimony
        Regress
      ab: It is almost universally believed that some infinite regresses are vicious, and also almost universally believed that some are benign. In this paper I argue that regresses can be vicious for several different sorts of reasons. Furthermore, I claim that some intuitively vicious regresses do not suffer from any of the particular aetiologies that guarantee viciousness to regresses, but are nevertheless so on the basis of considerations of parsimony. The difference between some apparently benign and some apparently vicious regresses, then, turns out to be a matter of a more general assessment of costs and benefits, making viciousness of regresses in some cases less of a local matter than is usually thought.
      pubtype: Academic Journal
      doctype: Article
      src: R
    language: English
    refInfo:
    copyright:
      @attributes:
        flag: Y
      custom: Copyright of Metaphilosophy is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use.
      item: Metaphilosophy
      holder: Wiley-Blackwell
      dt:
        @attributes:
          year: 2001
    holdings:
      @attributes:
        islocal: N