The Regularity Account of Relational Spacetime.

A version of relationism that takes spatiotemporal structures-spatial geometry and a standard of inertia-to supervene on the history of relations between bodies is described and defended. The account is used to explain how the relationist should con- strue models of Newtonian mechanics in which abso...

Descripción completa

Detalles Bibliográficos
Publicado en:Mind (0026-4423) Vol. 115; no. 457; pp. 41 - 74
Autor principal: Huggett, Nick
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Oxford University Press / USA Jan2006
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
fields @attributes:
  recordID: 1
pdfLink:
plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=20588940&site=ehost-live
header:
  @attributes:
    shortDbName: hlh
    uiTerm: 20588940
    longDbName: Humanities International Complete
    uiTag: AN
  controlInfo:
    bkinfo:
    jinfo:
      jid:
        00264423
        MND
      jtl: Mind (0026-4423)
      issn: 00264423
      maglogo: N
    pubinfo:
      dt: Jan2006
      vid: 115
      iid: 457
      pid: 622
      pub: Oxford University Press / USA
    artinfo:
      ui:
        20588940
        10.1093/mind/fzl041
      ppf: 41
      ppct: 33
      formats:
        fmt:
          @attributes:
            type: P
            size: 238KB
      tig:
        atl: The Regularity Account of Relational Spacetime.
      aug:
        au: Huggett, Nick
        affil: Department of Philosophy, MC 267, University of Illinois at Chicago, Chicago, IL 60607, USA
      su:
        Relation (Philosophy)
        Geometry
        Spatio-temporal variation
        Inertia (Mechanics)
        Acceleration (Mechanics)
        Free will & determinism
      sug:
        subj:
          Relation (Philosophy)
          Geometry
          Spatio-temporal variation
          Inertia (Mechanics)
          Acceleration (Mechanics)
          Free will & determinism
      ab: A version of relationism that takes spatiotemporal structures-spatial geometry and a standard of inertia-to supervene on the history of relations between bodies is described and defended. The account is used to explain how the relationist should con- strue models of Newtonian mechanics in which absolute acceleration manifestly does not supervene on the relations; Ptolemaic and Copernican models for example. The account introduces a new way in which a Lewis-style 'best system' might capture regularities in a broadly Humean world; a defence is given against a charge of indeterminism that applies to any such approach to laws.
      pubtype: Academic Journal
      doctype: Article
      src: R
    language: English
    refInfo:
    copyright:
      @attributes:
        flag: Y
      custom: © 2019 Mind Association.
      item: Mind (0026-4423)
      holder: Oxford University Press / USA
      dt:
        @attributes:
          year: 2006
    holdings:
      @attributes:
        islocal: N