Plural Descriptions and Many-valued Functions.
Russell had two theories of definite descriptions: one for singular descriptions, another for plural descriptions. We chart its development, it which 'On Denoting' plays a part but not the part one might expect, before explaining why it eventually fail. We go on to consider many-valued functions,...
| Published in: | Mind (0026-4423) Vol. 114; no. 456; pp. 1039 - 1069 |
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| Main Authors: | , |
| Format: | Article |
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Oxford University Press / USA
Oct2005
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| Online Access: | View this record in EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=20617322&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 20617322 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00264423 MND jtl: Mind (0026-4423) issn: 00264423 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Oct2005 vid: 114 iid: 456 pid: 622 pub: Oxford University Press / USA artinfo: ui: 20617322 10.1093/mind/fzi1039 ppf: 1039 ppct: 30 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 269KB tig: atl: Plural Descriptions and Many-valued Functions. aug: au: Oliver, Alex Smiley, Timothy affil: Faculty of Philosophy, University of Cambridge, Cambridge CB3 9DA, UK Clare College, Cambridge CB2 1TL, UK su: Description (Philosophy) Definition (Logic) Philosophy Theory of knowledge Meaning (Philosophy) sug: subj: Description (Philosophy) Definition (Logic) Philosophy Theory of knowledge Meaning (Philosophy) ab: Russell had two theories of definite descriptions: one for singular descriptions, another for plural descriptions. We chart its development, it which 'On Denoting' plays a part but not the part one might expect, before explaining why it eventually fail. We go on to consider many-valued functions, since they too bring in plural terms—terms such as '√' or the descriptive 'the inhabitants of London' which, like plain plural descriptions, stand for more than one thing. Logicians need to take plural reference seriously if only because mathematicians take many-valued functions seriously. We assess the objection (by Russell, Frege and others) that many-valued functions are illegitimate because the corresponding terms are ambiguous. We also assess the various methods proposed for getting rid of them. Finding the objection ill-founded and the methods ineffective, we introduce a logical framework that admits plural reference, and use it answer some earlier questions and to raise some more. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: © 2019 Mind Association. item: Mind (0026-4423) holder: Oxford University Press / USA dt: @attributes: year: 2005 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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